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PROHIBITED FLOOR TRADING ACTIVITIES
UNDER THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT
JERRY W. MARKHAM*
INTRODUCTIONO N January 19, 1989, the Chicago Tribune published the remarkable
story of an elaborate sting operation conducted by the FBI and the
Office of the United States Attorney in Chicago.' Undercover FBI
agents had purchased seats on the Chicago Board of Trade and the Chi-
cago Mercantile Exchange.2 The Tribune reported that the agents, dis-
guised as traders, secretly recorded hundreds of conversations in the
trading pits of those two exchanges.3 The agents leased expensive apart-
ments and provided elaborate entertainment in order to ingratiate them-
selves into the club-like atmosphere on the exchange floors.4 The local
press reported that the sting operation had uncovered widespread
*Partner, Rogers & Wells, Washington, D.C.; adjunct professor, Georgetown Uni-
versity Law Center. B.S. 1969, Western Kentucky University; J.D. 1971, University of
Kentucky; L.L.M. 1974, Georgetown University. Mr. Markham has served as Chief
Counsel of the Enforcement Division of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, as
Secretary and Counsel of the Chicago Board Options Exchange, and as an attorney at the
Securities and Exchange Commission.
1. Drew & Crawford, FBI Tape Key to Fraud Investigation, Chicago Tribune, Jan.
19, 1989, § 1, at 1, col. 6. See Burns & Drell, 200 New Subpoenas Target 10 Billion
Documents, Chicago Sun Times, Jan. 25, 1989, at 1, col. 1; Jouzaitis & Gaines, Trading
Probe Intensifies; 200 Subpoenas Are Issued, Chicago Tribune, Jan. 25, 1989, § 1, at 1,
col. 4; Federal Probe Targets 6 Top Futures Traders, Chicago Sun Times, Jan. 20, 1989, at
7, col. 1; Drew & Crawford, How FBI Worked Trader Sting, Chicago Tribune, Jan. 20,
1989, § 1, at 1, col. 2. The FBI conducted its operations at two Chicago exchanges: the
Chicago Board of Trade and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. The FBI code names for
the investigations were "Operation Sour Mash" and "Operation Hedge Clipper" respec-
tively. See Drew & O'Brien, 2 Agents Linger, Listen at Exchanges, Chicago Tribune, Jan.
26, 1989, § 1, at 1, col. 5; see also Berg, Merc, Board of Trade Said to Begin Inquiries,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1989, § 1, at 39, col. 1 (discussing FBI fraud inquiry); Berg, F.B.I.
Said to Study Chicago Cheating in Futures Trades, N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1989, at Al, col.
1 (FBI investigation into broker fraud).
2. See Crawford, Agent in Trading Probe Proves Skill-and Luck, Chicago Tribune,
Jan. 24, 1989, § 1, at 1, col. 2; Burton & Crawford, Farm Firm's Complaint Led to Probe,
Chicago Tribune, Jan. 22, 1989, § 1, at 1,,col. 3.
3. See Burton & Marx, Trader Attorneys Challenge Probe Taping Tactic, Chicago
Tribune, Feb. 19, 1989, § 7, at 1, col. 1; Drew & Possley, Probers Press for Trader Cooper-
ation, Chicago Tribune, Jan. 21, 1989, § 1, at 1, col. 1; see also Greising, Traders'Lawyers
Attack Secret Tapings as Illegal, Chicago Sun Times, Feb. 19, 1989, at 81, col. 6 (discuss-
ing defense attempts to exclude secret tape recordings).
4. See F.B.L Commodities 'Sting'" Fast Money, Secret Lives, N.Y. Times, Jan. 30,
1989, at Al, col. 4; Petacque, How Traders Got Trapped, Chicago Sun Times, Jan. 22,
1989, at 1, col. 1; Eichenwald, FBI Intensijing Commodity Inquiry on Chicago Trades,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1989, § 1, at 1, col. 1; see also Marx, Only Thin Cover Hid F.B.L
Futures Probe, Chicago Tribune, Feb. 7, 1989, § 1, at 1, col. 2 (agents "high-rolling"
lifestyle supported by very thin cover); Gunset & Cohen, Probe Shatters Exchanges' Club
Atmosphere, Chicago Tribune, Jan. 22, 1989, § 1, at 14, col. 1 (agents successfully per-
formed "qualifying dance" to gain entry into exchanges).
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abuses.' Indeed, in July of 1989 federal grand juries in Chicago returned
indictments against forty six traders.' These events have focused wide-
spread attention on the floor trading practices of the commodity futures
exchanges.7
5. The Financial Times reported that the probe would uncover schemes of cheating
"that run[] into tens of millions of dollars." Hargreaves, Agents Posed as Traders in
Their Hunt for Evidence, Fin. Times, Mar. 8, 1989, Survey, at IV. It was also reported
that as many as 100 traders had been systematically cheating customers out of millions of
dollars. See Petacque, FBI Probes, Chicago Sun Times, Jan. 26, 1989, at 1, col. I (prose-
cutors informed judicial officials that FBI sting operation would yield at least 100 indict-
ments); Burton & Crawford, Farm Firm s Complaint Led to Probe, Chicago Tribune, Jan.
22, 1989, § 1, at 1, col. 3; see also Berg, Commodity Case Seen Expanding, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 24, 1989, at D1, col. 6 (while more subpoenas issued, government looks for mail and
tax fraud in addition to trading abuses); Eichenwald, F.B.L Intensifying Commodity In-
quiry on Chicago Trades, N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1989, § 1, at 1, col. I (long investigation
produces 50-100 subpoenas). Subsequent newspaper reports suggested that the operation
had uncovered less wrongdoing than had been originally suspected. See Berg, Lawyers
See Hurdles for Futures Inquiry, N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1989, at D2, col. 5; Eichenwald,
More Than 100 Subpoenas Served on Commodity Firms, N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1989, at
Dl, col. I.
6. See United States v. Dempsey, No. 89-666, indictment (N.D. Ill. Aug. 2, 1989)
(soybean traders on Chicago Board of Trade indicted for violations of Commodity Ex-
change Act, mail and wire fraud, false statements, conspiracy, and RICO); United States
v. Goberstein, No. 89-667, indictment (N.D. Il. Aug. 2, 1989) (charges against U.S.
Treasury Bond traders on Chicago Board of Trade); United States v. Bailin, No. 89-668,
indictment (N.D. Il. Aug. 2, 1989) (charges against Japanese yen traders on Chicago
Board of Trade); United States v. Mosky, No. 89-669, indictment (N.D. Ill. Aug. 2, 1989)
(charges against Swiss franc traders on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange). Some traders
have pleaded guilty to the charges. See Berg, 3 Brokers Plead Guilty in Commodity In-
quiry, N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1989, at D2, col. 5.
The government refused to specify the amount of money alleged to have been de-
frauded from customers as a result of the conduct set forth in the indictments. See Litke,
Customers Unaware of Trading Losses as Exchanges Move to Limit Damage, Associated
Press Release, Aug. 4, 1989. A review of the indictments, however, suggests that the
total dollar amount involved in the transactions (some 1500 trades) is not great, at least
when viewed in the context of the widespread publicity given to the Chicago investigation
and in view of the billions of dollars that are at stake in the commodities markets at any
one time. Several authorities even characterized the charges as "comparatively minor
crimes." Eichenwald, Business and the Law; Commodity Charges Widen Use of Racke-
teering Statute, N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1989, at Dl, col. 1. Nevertheless, such practices
could be destructive of consumer confidence in the integrity of the markets. See generally
The Chicago Indictments, Washington Post, Aug. 5, 1989, at A16, col. 1 (discussing need
for careful regulation of commodities markets); Dishneau, Gov't: Charges Against 46
Traders Only 'First Step," Associated Press Release, Aug. 3, 1989 (probe part of ex-
panding crackdown on white collar crime). Additional indictments may be returned. See
Dishneau, Commodities Scandal Lives Up to Advance Billing, Associated Press Release,
Aug. 6, 1989.
In any event, controversy about the government's investigation continues, with charges
being made that the press was used to leak the government's case and to place pressure on
traders under investigation. See They Can Dish It Out, But They Can't Take It, Chicago
Times Mag. Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 11; Protess, Did the Press Play Prosecutor in Covering the
FBI Sting, C.J. Rev. July-Aug. 1989, at 37; Dishneau, Commodities Scandal Lives Up to
Advance Billing, Associated Press Release, Aug. 6, 1989.
7. See Hargreaves, Agents Posed as Traders in their Hunt for Evidence, Fin. Times,
Mar. 8, 1989, Survey, at IV; Hargreaves, Fraud Inquiry Stills the Hubbub of Chicago
Trading, Fin. Times, Feb. 9, 1989, § 1, at 8; Behof, Life in the Pits Will Never Be the
COMMODITIES REGULATION
This article reviews the nature and background of the federal regula-
tory scheme imposed on trading activities on the floors of the commodity
exchanges.' The article discusses the need for a better "audit trail" to
uncover trading abuses 9 and examines the phenomenon of "dual" trad-
Same, Bus. Wk., Feb. 6, 1989, at 32; Pauly, More Shoes Drop in the Pits, Newsweek, Feb.
6, 1989, at 50; McWhirter, A Bid to Salvage a Go-Go Legacy; Chicago's Commodities
Guru Pledges to Clean Up the Pits, Time, Feb. 6, 1989, at 52; Work, Black, Sheets &
Adkins, In the Futures Pits, Life Is No Longer a Bowl of Cherries, U.S. News & World
Report, Feb. 6, 1989, at 44; Szymczak & Gaines, CFTC Put on Hold For Probe, Chicago
Tribune, Feb. 2, 1989, § 3, at 1, col. 6; McCormick, The Sting in the Pits, Newsweek, Jan.
30, 1989, at 54; Yates, Futures Probe Has Tokyo's Attention, Chicago Tribune, Jan. 30,1989, § 4, at 1, col. 2. The Chicago investigations led to further action by the Depart-
ment of Justice, which created special task forces in five other cities: New York, Los
Angeles, San Francisco, Kansas City and Denver. The Department of Justice directed
these task forces to examine futures and other financial activities, including securities
sales. See Briggs, 'Crime in the Suites' Targeted, Chicago Sun Times, Feb. 1, 1989, at 1,
col. 3; Horrock, U.S. Widens Probe of Trading, Chicago Tribune, Feb. 1, 1989, § 1, at 1,
col. 2. In May of 1989, the New York Times and Wall Street Journal reported that the
CFTC and a grand jury were investigating the New York exchanges. See Gilpin, A Pain-ful Way to Be Noticed, N.Y. Times, May 10, 1989, at Dl, col. 3; Siconolfi & Power, New
York Futures Trader Subpoenaed by U.S. Grand Jury, Individuals Say, Wall St. J., May 9,
1989, at C25, col. 1; Eichenwald, Commodity Inquiry Focuses on Sharing of Order Data,N.Y. Times, May 9, 1989, at Dl, col. 1; Power & Siconolfi, Key Traders Face Glare of
Inquiry, Wall St. J., May 8, 1989, at Cl, col. 6; Eichenwald, Commodity Inquiry Said to
Have a Second Focus, N.Y. Times, May 6, 1989, at 43, col. 3; Eichenwald, New York
Commodity Inquiry, N.Y. Times, May 5, 1989, at Dl, col. 6; Siconolfi & Power, New
York Commodity Markets Raided, Wall St. J., May 5, 1989, at Cl, col. 3.
8. Commodity futures contracts and commodity options contracts are traded on the
exchange floors. A commodity futures contract imposes an obligation on the purchaser
to buy a stated commodity of a given quality or specification. The seller incurs a recipro-
cal obligation to deliver the commodity on the agreed upon date. A commodity option
contract gives a purchaser the right (but not the obligation) to acquire the commodity at
a specified price (the "exercise" price) during the life of the option contract. The pur-
chaser pays a premium for that right. The price of commodity futures and commodity
options are negotiated in "pits" or "rings" on the commodity futures exchanges. The
commodity exchanges guarantee performance of their contracts. See generally Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 358 (1982) (historical develop-
ment of futures exchanges); S. Rep. No. 384, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 188 (1982) (role of
clearinghouse in deliveries on futures contracts); Markham & Gilberg, Stock and Com-
modity Options-Two Regulatory Approaches and Their Conflicts, 47 Alb. L. Rev. 741(1983) (discussing stock and commodity trading abuses and subsequent regulation bySEC and CFTC); Futures Industry Association, An Introduction to The Futures Mar-
kets 7 (1984) (discussing workings of futures contracts); Chicago Board of Trade, Com-
modity Trading Manual 8 (1973) (defining futures contract).
9. An audit trail is a system that permits the reconstruction of the sequence of the
execution of commodity futures transactions. To illustrate, a large brokerage firm re-
ceives an order from a customer at its branch office in Louisville, Kentucky. The order is
transmitted to the exchange floor to a booth of the brokerage firm, then to a pit or ring on
the floor where orders are executed against other orders of customers or floor traders.
The execution of the order is reported back to the brokerage firm's booth, then to thebrokerage firm's office, and finally to the customer. In order to determine whether the
order was handled properly and executed competitively, it is often necessary to pinpoint
the time of the receipt of the order at the brokerage firm's office, its transmission to the
floor, its execution time, and the time of the report back to the booth on the floor and
eventually to the customer. An audit trail times the receipt of the order at each phase ofits processing, execution, and handling. See generally Proposed Regulations Regarding
1989]
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ing, in which floor brokers execute orders for customers as well as for
their own accounts, creating potential conflicts of interest.'° The article
also reviews cases that have raised trade practice issues and discusses the
appropriateness of reforms that have been suggested as a result of the
Chicago sting operation.
I. REGULATION OF COMMODITY FUTURES
A. Background of the Regulatory Framework
Commodity futures are regulated under the Commodity Exchange Act
of 1936.1' That statute was substantially amended by the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974 (the "CFTC Act of 1974")"2
which created the Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC"
or the "Commission"), an independent federal agency which was envi-
sioned to be the futures industry equivalent of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission.' 3 The Commodity Exchange Act imposes federal
regulation through a licensing scheme that requires exchanges to register
with the CFTC as "contract markets," 14 and traders who execute cus-
tomer orders on the floor of a contract market to register as "floor bro-
kers."15 The Commodity Exchange Act also prohibits certain fraudulent
trading practices such as "fictitious" trades, "wash" sales, "accommoda-
Dual Trading by Floor Brokers and Futures Commission Merchants, [1975-1977 Trans-
fer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,118, at 20,843-44 (Dec. 18, 1975) [hereinaf-
ter Proposed Dual Trading Regulations] (discussing audit trail); J. Markham, The History
of Commodity Futures Trading and Its Regulation 90-91 (1987) (defining time-stamping
requirements).
10. A floor broker is a trader on the exchange floor who executes customers' orders.
As such, he is required to register with the CFTC. See 7 U.S.C. § 6(e) (1982). A floor
trader trades only for his own account. Floor brokers may also trade for their own ac-
counts, giving rise to the concept of dual trading, in which floor brokers trade both as
principal and as agent. The CFTC allows dual trading only in situations in which a floor
broker trades for himself on the same day in which he trades for another person in the
same commodity for future delivery. See Proposed Dual Trading Regulations, supra note
9, at 20,843 n.3.
11. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1982).
12. Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389 (1974) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26
(1982)).
13. In fact, the CFTC was "patterned" after the SEC. See 120 Cong. Rec. 30,467
(1974) (remarks of Sen. Taft).
14. See 7 U.S.C. § 7 (1982). Contract markets must meet certain minimal require-
ments before being licensed by the CFTC. Their operations are subject to regulation. See
7 U.S.C. § 7-7(a) (1982). See generally, 1 P. Johnson & T. Hazen, Commodities Regula-
tion §§ 1.20-1.30, at 85 (2d ed. 1989) (describing rules and regulations of contract
markets).
15. See 7 U.S.C. § 6e (1982). Individuals who trade only for their own accounts on
the floor of the exchange are not presently required to register with the CFTC. See T.
Russo, Regulation of the Commodity Futures and Options Markets § 1.01 (1983); Mark-
ham & Bergin, The Role of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission in International
Commodity Transactions, 18 Geo. W.J. Int'l. L. & Econ. 581, 586 n.26 (1985). A bill
recently passed by the House, however, would require such registration. See H.R. 2869,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 205 (July 12, 1989); H.R. Rep. No. 236, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 205 (1989).
COMMODITIES REGULATION
tion" trades, 6 the improper "offset" of customer orders17 and certain
"cross" trades."8
Since its inception, the CFTC has sought to strengthen its regulatory
control over the futures industry, an industry that prides itself on being a
last bastion of free enterprise and that has strongly resisted federal regu-
latory efforts. 9 Much of the CFTC's resources, however, has been di-
verted by the widescale fraudulent practices in off-exchange instruments
which the CFTC has only in recent years brought under control.20 De-
spite such distractions, the CFTC has mounted several regulatory efforts
to control floor trading abuses. These efforts included, as will be dis-
cussed below, a fourteen-year program to prevent dual trading abuses
and to enhance the "audit trail" requirements for futures trading, so that
abuses could be uncovered more readily.2' In the 1970s, the CFTC also
spearheaded criminal investigations of schemes to evade income taxes
through fraudulent and fictitious trading practices on the floors of the
exchanges in Chicago and New York.22 The events reported in Chicago
have again raised the issue of whether additional regulatory efforts are
needed to detect and prevent abuses.
B. The Time-Stamping Issue and Dual Trading
1. The Audit Trail
An audit trail for surveillance and investigative purposes is a means to
reconstruct trading by time-stamping orders for commodity futures con-
tracts at each phase of their handling and execution. 3 A complete audit
16. See 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a)(3)(A) (1982).
17. See 7 U.S.C. § 6b(2)(c) (1982).
18. See 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a)(3)(A) (1982); 17 C.F.R. §§ 1.38, 1.39 (1987).
19. See Laing, US. Study of Soybean Trading is Seen Leading to Tax-Law, Other
Indictments, Wall St. J., Aug. 9, 1976, at 18, col. 2. See generally J. Markham, supra note
9 (discussing history of commodities regulation).
20. These off-exchange instruments involved commodity options that were not
backed by actual commodities and often resulted in the bankruptcy of firms marketing
them, with commensurate loss to customers who had been induced to invest by fraudu-
lent promises of great profits. See Lower, The Regulation of Commodity Options, 1978
Duke L.J. 1095, 1113; Markham & Gilberg, Stock and Commodity Options-Two Regu-
latory Approaches and Their Conflicts, 47 Alb. L. Rev. 741, 759-69 (1983). See generally
Gilberg, Regulation of New Financial Instruments Under the Federal Securities and Com-
modities Laws, 39 Vand. L. Rev. 1599 (1986) (analyzing jurisdictional dispute between
CFTC and SEC over new financial instruments); Schroeder, Inadvertent Futures Con-
tracts, 19 Rev. Sec. & Comm. Reg. 896 (1986) (discussing new financial instruments and
recommending lifting the ban on off-exchange futures contracts); Young & Stein, Swap
Transactions Under the Commodity Exchange Act: Is Congressional Action Needed?, 76
Geo. L.J. 1917 (1988) (analyzing swaps as futures contracts and studying exclusion of
swaps from CEA provisions).
21. See infra notes 23-97 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 128-156 and accompanying text.
23. See supra note 9. The processing of commodity futures orders has been described
as follows:
[t]he order is sent via phone or telex to the exchange trading floor, where it is
received by an order clerk. A messenger carries the order to the appropriate
19891
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trail allows the government to determine, for example, whether customer
orders were executed at prices prevailing in the market at the time of
execution or whether traders took unfair advantage of customer orders.2 4
Under CFTC regulations, a brokerage firm receiving a customer order
is required to prepare a written record of the order and to time stamp
that record to the nearest minute.25 If transmitted to the floor orally, the
order must be recorded again on a "floor" order and this document must
also be time-stamped. 6 In addition, the floor order has to be time-
stamped when it is returned to the broker's floor booth after execution in
member in the pit. If it is a market order it is filled immediately. If it is a
contingent order and not immediately executable, the floor broker puts it into
his "deck" of resting unexecuted orders, filed by price and time received. When
the order is filled the above process reverses, terminating with the customer's
receipt of the reported execution and price. As each transaction is completed in
the pit, an observing reporter records the trade and price. This information is
immediately displayed on the quotation board visible from the trading floor,
and is also flashed to other markets, brokerage offices, and trading centers
throughout the U.S. and overseas via wire services and other media.
Futures Industry Association, An Introduction to the Futures Market 3 (1984); see S.
Rep. No. 1131, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 16-17 (1974); H.R. Rep. No. 975, 93rd Cong., 2d
Sess. 136-37 (1974).
24. The following excerpt from a CFTC report indicates the importance of an ade-
quate audit trail:
In developing evidence that a broker has traded ahead of a customer order, a
precise reconstruction of trading usually is essential. The current procedures
•.. are inadequate in many cases for staff to determine clearly that a broker had
a customer order in his possession when he traded for himself. For instance, in
a recent administrative action, Enforcement was unable to persuade the admin-
istrative law judge that a trading ahead violation occurred because of the inabil-
ity to sequence trades clearly with available timing and other data. This
occurred despite the fact that the exchange had found the broker's actions viola-
tive of the exchange's trading ahead rules.
CFTC Division of Trading and Markets, Memoranda: Audit Trail Enhancements, Pro-
posed Amendments to Commission Regulation 1.35, at 41-42 (1985) (footnote omitted).
The CFTC also noted the importance of timing data in price manipulation investigations.
For example, in one case, the CFTC staff concluded that, because of the lack of precise
trade timing information, it could not meet its burden of establishing that a specific floor
broker caused a large price increase. See id. at 42-43.
25. See 17 C.F.R. § 1.35(a-1)(1) (1988); CFTC Interpretive Letter No. 75-15, Re-
cording of Customers' Orders by Futures Commission Merchants, [1975-1977 Transfer
Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 20,103, at 20,774 (Oct. 8, 1975). The exchanges
were required to submit a plan by January 16, 1977, showing how they were developing a
"method, through time-stamping or otherwise, for recording the sequence of futures
transactions executed on the contract market." Proposed Change in the Records of
Commodity Futures Transactions, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
(CCH) 20,764, at 23,134 (Feb. 20, 1979).
26. See 17 C.F.R. § 1.35(a-1)(2) (1988); CFTC Interpretive Letter No. 75-14, Re-
cording of Customers' Orders by Members/Brokers on the Floor, [1975-1977 Transfer
Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,102, at 20,772 (Oct. 8, 1975). Some orders are
wired to the floor where they are printed out and time-stamped automatically. See Chi-
cago Board of Trade, Commodity Trading Manual 158 (1982). See generally T. Hierony-
mus, Economics of Futures Trading 56-57 (2d ed. 1977) (emphasis placed on minimizing
time from order receipt to execution in pit).
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the pit.27
There is, however, no requirement that the order be time-stamped
upon its execution in the pit. As a result, there is often a significant gap
in the audit trail.28
During congressional consideration of the CFTC Act of 1974, Repre-
sentative Poage expressed concern that the gap between the receipt on
the floor of the exchange and its return to the broker's booth, as well as
the absence of time-stamping for floor traders, permitted abuses to go
undetected.29 During such gaps, prices often fluctuated broadly, al-
lowing unscrupulous floor brokers to take advantage of those price
swings and profit at the customer's expense by changing the order execu-
tion prices to make them more advantageous to the opposite trader, or
through other fraudulent acts.3"
Congressman Wampler of Virginia stated before the Congress that the
importance of time-stamping order executions in the trading pit could
not be over-emphasized because it would permit the CFTC to determine
"whether floor brokers trade ahead of their customers in order to get the
best price themselves," and whether floor traders were increasing price
fluctuations by "jumping in en masse when prices have begun moving in
a certain direction."3 Congressman Wampler said that time-stamping
order executions would allow the CFTC to determine whether floor bro-
kers actually minimized price swings, as claimed by floor brokers to jus-
tify the time and place advantage on the trading floor. Time-stamping
would also enable the CFTC to determine whether floor brokers were
justified in trading for themselves as well as for customers and to ascer-
tain "whether the abuses are so rampant that this practice should not be
allowed."32
Representative Wampler also noted that many abuses associated with
traders on the floor could not be detected because the time sequence of
their trades could not be determined from the records.33
This omission bears heavily on the question of whether or not dual
trading-trading by brokers both for customers and for their own ac-
counts-should be prohibited or restricted .... Neither the CEA nor
the commodity futures trading industry knows the extent of dual trad-
ing abuses, and neither can know in the absence of timing
27. See 17 C.F.R. § 1.35(a-1)(4) (1988).
28. The CFTC has attempted to require exchanges to implement trade sequencing
systems that will allow a determination of the time of the execution of an order within
one minute of its execution in a pit on the floor of an exchange. See infra notes 44-97 and
accompanying text.
29. See, e.g., 120 Cong. Rec. 34,736-55 (1974) (statement of Representative Poage
concerning congressional efforts to strengthen commodities regulation); CFTC Division
of Trading and Markets, Memoranda: Audit Trail Enhancements, Proposed Amend-
ments to Commission Regulation 1.35, at 6-8 (1985) (recommending time-stamping).
30. See 120 Cong. Rec. 34,751 (1974).
31. Id. at 34,751.
32. Id.
33. See id.
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Mr. Wampler also asserted that strengthened surveillance of floor
traders who trade only for themselves was necessary. Indeed, the CFTC
regulatory predecessor, the Commodity Exchange Authority ("CEA"),
had informed the Comptroller General that without better timing infor-
mation it could not determine whether floor traders were perpetrating
abuses, nor could it ascertain the extent of traders' influence on futures
prices. A record of the time of execution was needed to discover whether
floor traders were buying on price advances and selling on price declines,
thereby accentuating price movements.3a
It was further claimed that the importance of timing of order execu-
tion had been demonstrated during a Senate investigation of the Russian
grain sales in the 1970s.36 A Congressional committee, the Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Govern-
ment Operations, had concluded that "it was impossible to determine
whether orders to buy and sell on the Kansas City Board of Trade had
affected the closing price[s] because the times of such trades were not
recorded."' 37 The Committee pointed out that this information "was
needed to determine whether large grain exporters were pushing up clos-
ing prices in order to increase their export subsidies."38
A proposed Senate amendment to the 1974 legislation would have re-
quired exchanges to submit to the CFTC a record showing each trade
made on the exchange, including the time the contract was executed. 9
A conference committee, however, modified the proposal.' Although
the committee saw time-stamping as an effective means of policing trad-
ing, it did not believe that time-stamping should be mandated by statute.
The committee believed that it was technically impossible to implement
time-stamping on the effective date of the 1974 legislation. Instead, the
conference committee allowed the CFTC to use its powers to require
time-stamping. In so doing, the committee urged the CFTC to move
34. Id. at 34,752 (letter from Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller General of the United
States, to Sen. Clark).
35. See id.
36. See id. Congress expressed concern over commodity futures trading in connec-
tion with large grain sales to the Soviet Union in the early 1970s. See, e.g., 120 Cong.
Rec. 10,751 (1974) (statements of Rep. Smith) (Russians bought more grain than needed,
then sold it at higher price, thereby profiting from manipulation that would be illegal if
done by domestic purchaser); Russian Grain Transactions: Hearings Before the Perma-
nent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations,
United States Senate, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. Part I (1973) (analyzing Russian grain
purchase and resale). In fact, although no wrongdoing was uncovered, the "Great Grain
Robbery" has been described as "one of those economic events that, like the OPEC oil
embargo ... can truly be said to have changed the world." Morgan, Merchants of Grain
120-21 (1979).
37. 120 Cong. Rec. 34,752 (1974) (letter from Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller General
of the United States, to Sen. Clark).
38. Id.
39. See S. Rep. No. 1194, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 1-32 (1974).
40. Id. at 42.
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quickly to develop and implement a technically feasible approach to
time-stamping. 41 Several conferees wanted the CFTC to require the re-
porting of the trade as soon as it was practical for the exchange to pro-
vide that information. The committee thought, however, that maximum
discretion should be given to the CFTC which would become the true
expert.42 Congress expected and hoped that the CFTC would "require
whatever information that is necessary to allow the Commission to do an
adequate job of policing abuses."'43
2. The Time-Stamping Odyssey
In a release issued on December 18, 1975, the CFTC announced its
intention to require all contract markets that allowed dual trading' to
establish a system for time sequencing trades in order to detect abuses
more readily.45 Approximately one year later, the CFTC stated that the
detection and prevention of market manipulation and trading abuses
such as "trading ahead" of customers 46 and "three-cornered deals" 47
were dependent upon rapid and accurate transaction time sequence re-
construction.48 While the CFTC found little evidence that such trading
abuses occurred with significant frequency, it was not prepared to assume
that those abuses were isolated, because the exchanges were unable to
determine whether they were occurring.4 9 The CFTC also cited a report
of the Comptroller General which had concluded that without time-
stamping it was virtually impossible to detect dual trading, in which a
broker trades for his own account while holding customer orders.5"
41. See 120 Cong. Rec. 34,751 (1974); 120 Cong. Rec. 34,997-35,001 (1974).
42. See 120 Cong. Rec. 34,998 (1974) (statements of Rep. Talmadge).
43. Id.
44. Dual trading takes place when a broker trades for his own account either on the
same day he trades for his own account or while holding customer orders. 1988 CFTC
Ann. Rep. 129.
45. See 40 Fed. Reg. 58660, reprinted in, Proposed Regulations Regarding Dual
Trading by Floor Brokers and Futures Commission Merchants, [1975-1977 Transfer
Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,118, at 20,843 (Dec. 18, 1975).
46. Trading ahead of customers means that a broker, aware that a large order coming
to the exchange will likely influence prices, trades prior to that order and benefits from
the effect of the large order on prices. See 1988 CFTC Ann. Rep. 132. In United States
v. Dial, 757 F.2d 163 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 838 (1985), the Seventh Circuit
upheld a criminal conviction for such conduct under the mail and wire fraud statutes.
Id.; see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (1982); see also Markham, "Front-Running'--Insider
Trading Under the Commodity Exchange Act, 38 Cath. U.L. Rev. 69 (1988) (discussing
background regulation and statutory framework of front-running prohibitions).
47. Three-cornered deals take many forms. See infra notes 136-137 and accompany-
ing text.
48. See 41 Fed. Reg. 56,134, 56,139 (1976), reprinted in, Adoption of Dual Trading
Regulations-Records of Cash Commodity and Futures Transactions; Trading Stan-
dards for Floor Brokers and Futures Commission Merchants, [1975-1977 Transfer
Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,242, at 21,299 (Dec. 23, 1976) [hereinafter Dual
Trading Regulations; Trading Standards].
49. See id.
50. See Comptroller General of the United States, Report to the Congress on Im-
provements Needed in Regulation of Commodity Futures Trading, (June 24, 1975) (cited
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The exchanges contended that the time gaps were insignificant because
price changes on the floors of the exchanges were reported by traders to
exchange officials and those reports were timed. The exchanges claimed
that by comparing this "time and sales" data to the time stamps on the
floor order an audit trail could be established with some degree of accu-
racy. 1 Nevertheless, gaps in the audit trail persisted because time and
sales data did not record the size of transactions. Consequently, in mar-
kets with rapidly fluctuating prices,5 2 it was often difficult to determine
execution times for particular orders executed at the same prices.53
The CFTC also found that detecting trading abuses through the cur-
rent records kept by contract markets required a laborious cross-refer-
encing of data,5 4 which effectively precluded an efficient contract market
surveillance program. The absence of computerized data retrieval sys-
tems correlating the price of executions with the time of price changes
also made market surveillance efforts extremely time consuming and
inefficient. 5 While time and sales data permitted some trade reconstruc-
tions, that data was not effective in cyclical markets, in which prices
move up and down repeatedly. The CFTC noted that several cyclical
variations could occur during the time gap between a floor order being
time-stamped upon receipt on the floor and its being time-stamped back
at the booth on the floor upon the report of execution. As a result, it
would be difficult to assign a specific time to a particular transaction.
Moreover, because many trades took place in a matter of seconds, time
and sales information was frequently inaccurate.5 6
In order to remedy these problems, the CFTC believed that each con-
tract market should be required to maintain an accurate price change
in Proposed Dual Trading Regulations, supra note 9, at 20,844 n. 10). The Comptroller
General had made a similar statement to Congress concerning the legislation that became
the CFTC Act of 1974. See 120 Cong. Rec. 34,752 (1974) (letter from Elmer B. Staats,
Comptroller General of the United States, to Senator Clark).
The CFTC has said that "trade reconstruction presently is largely a manual, labor
intensive and time consuming activity. Numerous documents must be examined, sorted
and compared just to determine whether the evidence of a suspected violation is probative
enough to warrant further investigation." CFTC Division of Trading and Markets,
Memorandum: Audit Trail Enhancements: Proposed Amendments to Commission Reg-
ulation 1.35, at 43 (Nov. 19, 1985).
51. See Dual Trading Regulations; Trading Standards, supra note 48, at 21,300.
52. See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
53. See Dual Trading Regulations; Trading Standards, supra note 48, at 21,300. The
CFTC proposed a way to increase the usefulness of the time and sales data, requiring that
each contract market maintain an accurate price change register to record price changes
within ten seconds. See id. at 21,301; infra notes 57-58 and accompanying text. This
requirement was subsequently adopted. See 17 C.F.R. § 1.35(h) (1987).
54. See Dual Trading Regulations; Trading Standards, supra note 48, at 21,300.
55. See id.
56. See id. The CFTC also stated that time and sales data of the contract markets
was often inaccurate "[s]ince a large number of trades can take place in a matter of a few
seconds or minutes on any exchange, such inaccurate price change timing can easily in-
validate the accuracy of any reconstruction of the time and sequence of transactions
based upon such timing." Id.
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register to record each price change within ten seconds.5 7 Further, the
CFTC was of the view that the execution of each transaction should be
matched to a time period within which the possibility of a cyclical move-
ment was reduced to the greatest extent possible. The CFTC stated that
to achieve this measure of accuracy times would have to be stamped at
least to the nearest minute. The CFTC also asserted that its studies had
shown that "technology [was] adequate to enable contract markets to
record each detected price change within ten seconds.""8
In March of 1976, the CFTC held hearings 9 during which industry
representatives contended that, with current technology, time-stamping
executions would hamper the effective execution of transactions.60 The
industry representatives asserted that it would be possible to identify the
specific half hour interval within which a transaction was executed. 6' In
response to those assertions, the CFTC established a task force in April
of 1976 to consider "bracketing" as an alternative interim measure to one
minute time-stamping. In a bracketing system, traders would use sym-
bols on their trading cards to indicate transactions which took place
within the same half hour period.62
The CFTC task force concluded that, while time sequencing should
continue to be the ultimate goal for all markets, bracketing would be a
significant step forward for many markets and might be an acceptable
interim step.63 By bracketing, the price of the execution and its brack-
eted period of execution could be compared with time and sales and the
entry and exit time-stamps on the floor orders to focus more narrowly on
the exact time of the trade.64
The CFTC adopted a one minute stamping requirement for executions
in the trading pit, but it allowed the exchanges to petition for more time
to implement the system.65 Before granting such an extension the CFTC
required that the exchange show that the one minute timing requirement
57. See Dual Trading Regulations; Trading Standards, supra note 48, at 21,301.
58. Id. This requirement was subsequently adopted by the CFTC. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 1.35(h) (1987); supra note 53.
59. See Dual Trading Regulations; Trading Standards, supra note 48, at 21,291.
60. See Proposed Changes in the Records of Commodity Futures Transactions,
[1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,764, at 23,134-35 (Feb.
20, 1979) [hereinafter Bracketing of Trades]; Dual Trading Regulations; Trading Stan-
dards, supra note 48, at 21,291.
61. See Bracketing of Trades, supra note 60, at 23,134.
62. See id. at 23,139.
63. See id. at 23,135.
64. See Bracketing of Trades, supra note 60, at 23,137-38; Dual Trading Regulations;
Trading Standards, supra note 48, at 21,302.
65. See Dual Trading Regulations; Trading Standards, supra note 48, at 21,302-04.
The target date for compliance, from which an extension could be sought, was April 17,
1977. See id. at 21,291. June 13, 1977 was the effective date of the time-stamping re-
quirement. See Trading Standards for Floor Brokers and Futures Commission
Merchants and Records of Cash Commodity and Futures Transactions; Extension of
Comment Period, [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,263, at
21,429 (Jan. 24, 1977).
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would seriously disrupt the functions of the marketplace. Further, an
extension would be limited to one year.6 6 During the spring of 1977,
however, all ten of the existing exchanges petitioned the Commission for
extensions to comply with the time-stamping requirement. The CFTC
granted only four of the requests. The CFTC found that the exchanges
whose petitions were denied did not submit an acceptable plan for
achieving one minute trade timing.67
In February of 1979, the CFTC reevaluated its position on time-
stamping. It proposed that its regulations be revised to permit trades to
be bracketed in thirty minute periods rather than time-stamped to the
minute. The CFTC took this action after determining that it might be
impossible for contract markets to submit plans for speedy order execu-
tions within the time envisioned by the CFTC.6s The CFTC thereafter
eliminated its one minute time-stamping requirement and substituted a
bracketing provision, concluding that thirty minute bracketing would be
a step forward in policing floor brokers engaged in dual trading.69
66. See Bracketing of Trades, supra note 60, at 23,135.
67. See id. at 23,135-36; 17 C.F.R. 1.35 (g)(2) (1987) (extension requirements). The
exchanges whose petitions were denied included the Chicago Board of Trade, the Chi-
cago Mercantile Exchange, the New York Coffee and Sugar Exchange, and the New
York Cotton Exchange. See Bracketing of Trades, supra note 60, at 23,136 & n. 16.
68. See Bracketing of Trades, supra note 60, at 23,137. In adopting the bracketing
provision, the CFTC was exempting exchanges from the one minute time-stamping re-
quirement only until January 1, 1981. See Temporary Exemption From One-Minute
Time Sequencing Requirement, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
20,931, at 23,750 (Dec. 12, 1979). The CFTC also was continuing its efforts to seek a
one minute time-stamping requirement in order to meet four objectives:
(1) [t]o help prevent dual trading abuses, (2) to enable each contract market
and the Commission to reconstruct the sequence of transactions to facilitate the
detection of other trade practice abuses, (3) to make available further data to
prove trade practice abuses detected by other means, and (4) to provide accu-
rate time of execution information for the purpose of conducting general market
studies to evaluate the impact of trading activity over a given period of time.
Id. at 23,751 (footnote omitted).
69. See Recording of Trades by Contract Markets by Time Brackets, [1980-1982
Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 21,112, at 24,486-88 (Dec. 2, 1980). The
CFTC pointed out that its
determination not to continue with one-minute timing as a requirement of its
regulations is influenced considerably by the lack of evidence that technology is
currently available to permit all of the exchanges to adopt one-minute timing
systems and the concern that, absent such technology, the adoption of one-
minute timing as an absolute requirement would invite major disruptions to the
effective performance of the nation's commodity futures markets. Until such
time as the Commission is persuaded that technological or other program or
systems developments are capable of implementing more precise timing, time-
stamping or transaction sequencing systems, without posing a significant threat
of market disruption, the Commission does not believe that a continued com-
mitment to one-minute timing is in the public interest.
Id. at 24,488. See generally Revocation of Regulation Permitting Exemption of One-
Minute Timing of Trades, [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCII)
21,718 (May 10, 1983) (deleting requirements concerning one minute time-stamping for
exchanges).
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In 1984, however, the CFTC determined that bracketing was not pro-
viding the data that it needed. The CFTC's change of heart was spurred
by a congressionally directed study that required the CFTC to determine
whether insider trading was a problem in the commodity futures indus-
try." Although the CFTC concluded that insider trading did not pose a
danger to commodity futures trading, the Commission expressed its con-
cern over the potential harm of dual trading. The CFTC's concern was
heightened by deficiencies in the trade reconstruction systems on many
exchanges, which had created difficulties in enforcing the CFTC's regula-
tions governing dual traders.71 The CFTC declared that if dual trading
by floor brokers was not prohibited, as it is in the stock options markets,
a method of accurate and rapid transaction time sequence reconstruction
was needed.72
The inaccuracy of bracketing also helped to prevent the CFTC from
developing a capability to conduct computerized trade practice investiga-
tions. The CFTC noted that in September 1980, its Division of Trading
and Markets found that bracketing accuracy levels were low and that the
exchanges had made little or no effort to improve compliance with brack-
eting requirements through disciplinary sanctions. The CFTC also noted
that bracketing data was often insignificant in investigations.73 Addition-
ally, none "of the six exchanges using thirty-minute bracketing had made
any effort to implement a system of one minute timing"'74 and they had
not been diligent in using bracketing to ensure accuracy or to achieve the
objective of one minute timing.75 In fact, the rate of accuracy for brack-
eting systems was only 69%.76
The CFTC noted that the General Accounting Office ("GAO") had
presented two additional reports to Congress stressing the importance of
time-stamping. 77 In fact, the GAO criticized the CFTC's decision not to
70. See CFTC, A Study of the Nature, Extent and Effects of Futures Trading by
Persons Possessing Material, Non-Public Information (Sept. 1984) (hereinafter Insider
Trading Study).
71. See id. at 9-10.
72. See id. at 105.
73. See Trade Time-Sequencing Standards and Exchange Audit Trail Systems, [1984-
1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,450, at 29,968 (Dec. 27, 1984)
[hereinafter Trade Time-Sequencing].
74. Id.
75. See id. at 29,968-70. The CFTC also noted that its Division of Trading and Mar-
kets had prepared a memorandum entitled Thirty-Minute Bracketing and Exchange Au-
dit Trail Systems, dated September 26, 1984. In that memorandum, the Division
concluded that data generated by the bracketing system was not as useful or effective as
data generated by one minute timing systems and that this prejudiced the ability of the
CFTC and exchanges to detect and prosecute trade practice abuses. See Trade Time-
Sequencing, supra note 73, at 29,971 & n.10.
76. See id. at 29,968 n.7.
77. See id. at 29,967 n.5 (citing GAO, Report to the Congress-Commodity Futures
Regulation-Current Status and Unresolved Problems 127 (July 15, 1982)); GAO, Re-
port to the Congress, Regulation of Commodity Futures Market-What Needs To Be
Done 79 (May 17, 1978).
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adopt one minute time-stamping despite its clear benefits.7" The CFTC
also concluded that it was often difficult to reconstruct trades using
bracketing as a means of determining the actual time of execution. Be-
cause futures prices are volatile, prices recur several times during a half
hour period. It was impossible to determine independently the sequence
of trading when there were recurring prices in the same bracket period,
when order tickets lacked time stamps, or when the opposite side of the
transaction involved a floor trader trading for his own account (and thus
having no time stamp). This severely hampered the detection and prose-
cution of potential trading abuses. On the other hand, where prices were
moving in one direction or when time stamps from the trading booths
were relatively close in time, the order tickets could be compared to time
and sales reports and those two documents compared to broker trading
cards to pinpoint the execution time of a particular trade. Even then,
however, the process was time consuming.79
In contrast, some contract markets had developed one minute timing
systems, and the CFTC found that these exchanges had greatly enhanced
surveillance capabilities. From this data, the exchanges' compliance
staffs could more readily determine whether a particular pattern of trad-
ing was suspicious and whether further investigation was needed."0 The
CFTC also noted that computerized trade practice surveillance was a
practical necessity for the more active contracts. By adding trade time
execution data to a computerized surveillance system, more precise anal-
ysis could be made and the potential for accurate identification of possi-
ble trading abuses was increased.8 1
The CFTC also examined time-stamping practices on the securities ex-
changes. Trading on the Chicago Board Options Exchange ("CBOE"),
for example, was conducted by open outcry in a pit where approximately
two hundred traders handled order volumes comparable to those on the
futures exchanges. The CBOE had adopted rules which required that
both parties to a transaction manually note transaction times to the near-
est minute.8 2
78. See GAO, Report to the Congress-Commodity Futures Regulation-Current
Status and Unresolved Problems 127-28 (July 15, 1982); see also Trade Time-Sequencing,
supra note 73, at 29,967 n.5 (GAO report found Commission's decision not to adopt one
minute timing a "serious flaw in the exercise of its rule-making authority").
79. See Trade Time-Sequencing, supra note 73, at 29,969 (Dec. 27, 1984).
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See id. at 29,972. Three futures exchanges did employ one minute timing sys-
tems. On two of these exchanges, the broker or the trader noted the trade execution time.
At another exchange, officials of the exchange time-stamped brokers' cards within one
minute of the execution. See id. A fourth futures exchange required one minute timing
for one of its contracts, but not others. See id. at 29,972 n. I1. At a futures exchange that
required exchange officials to time-stamp cards, one of its contracts reached a record
volume of over 18,000 contracts in approximately 4,150 transactions. The CFTC noted
that in average daily transactions figures for all futures contracts traded in 1983 there
were only 10 contracts that averaged more than 4,000 transactions per day. See id. at
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In view of these developments, the CFTC proposed amendments to its
regulations which would require sequential reconstruction to the nearest
minute of each future or options contract executed on a contract mar-
ket.83 This proposal, however, did not call for a time-stamping require-
ment. Rather, it required that the exchanges develop a system to verify
the time of the execution within one minute. "The proposal would not
require any specific mechanical or electronic approach for assuring that
such time would be recorded."84
The CFTC later noted that the exchanges had suggested ways to estab-
lish an audit trail for orders. One plan would record "exit" times (the
moment that the order is reported out of the pit) in order to reconstruct
the trade. The CFTC noted, however, that the execution times were not
affixed, on the average, until some five minutes after the trade execution,
which would not meet the one minute recording goal of the CFTC."
The CFTC also noted a proposal by one exchange to reduce the thirty
minute bracket to fifteen minutes as an alternative to one minute time-
stamping.86 The CFTC found that while these suggestions were con-
structive, the Commission still needed verifiable one minute timed execu-
tions because some commodities market participants and investors still
suspected that the commodities market was fundamentally unfair. The
CFTC hoped that such trade timing systems might improve the public
perception of the fairness of the commodity futures markets, and thereby
increase participation in those markets.87
On January 14, 1986, the CFTC amended its regulations to require the
exchanges to establish systems to determine the minute of execution for
each trade. The exchanges were to implement the improved trade timing
systems requirement by October 1, 1986 and to demonstrate the use of
those systems by January 1, 1987.88 The CFTC stated that it would per-
mit a wide range of approaches to achieve verifiable one minute timing of
executions. Indeed, the rule "permits each contract market to comply
29,972. This suggested that most exchanges could develop a one minute time-stamping
mechanism for a great number of its futures contracts. See id.
83. See id. at 29,974.
84. Id. Contract markets that could not establish a verifiable mechanical or elec-
tronic trade reconstruction system within 90 days of the effective date could petition the
CFTC for approval of interim rules for alternative trade reconstruction that would in-
clude both parties manually recording each transaction execution time to the nearest
minute. See Time-Sequencing Standards and Audit Trail Systems, [1984-1986 Transfer
Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,499, at 30,213 (Mar. 4, 1985).
85. See Trade Timing Standards and Exchange Audit Trail Systems, [1984-1986
Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,861, at 31,537 (Jan. 21, 1986) [herein-
after Trade Timing Standards]. See generally CFTC Division of Trading and Markets,
Memorandum: Audit Trail Enhancements, Proposed Amendments to Commission Reg-
ulation 1.35, at 10 (Nov. 19, 1985) (current data from contract markets indicates exit
time not affixed until five minutes after execution).
86. See Trade Timing Standards, supra note 85, at 31,536.
87. See id. at 31,533-34.
88. See id.
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with the standard in the manner it chooses." 89
The result of the CFTC's open policy, however, was that the Commis-
sion failed to achieve universal one minute time-stamping. The Chicago
Board of Trade, for example, developed a computerized system to esti-
mate execution times through the correlation of exchange data, rather
than through time-stamping of execution tickets. 90 This computerized
trade reconstruction ("CTR") system incorporated data from the brack-
eting of trades and time and sales data to impute the one minute time of
execution. The CTR system also required traders to record their per-
sonal trades on pre-numbered sequential cards. Trades were required to
be entered on the trading cards in the same chronological sequence in
which they were executed. The system also required exchange members
to record the time of execution for all trades executedfor other members
on the floor, either on a trading card or on an order ticket. In addition,
the CTR system required clearing members to collect trading cards at
times designated by the exchange, in theory preventing cards from being
changed long after the fact. Clearing members were also required to syn-
chronize their time clocks with the official time of the exchange. 91
Following the disclosure in the Chicago Tribune of the FBI sting oper-
ation, the CFTC's Division of Trading and Markets examined the effec-
tiveness of the Chicago Board of Trade's CTR system.92 The Division
concluded that the CTR processing logic was deficient in several re-
spects. For example, the CFTC discovered that manual time informa-
tion was not being placed on orders executed for other members, that
89. Id. at 31,533. In adopting this requirement, the CFTC again stressed the difficul-
ties it had encountered in trying to reconstruct trading while investigating suspected
abuses:
Enforcement staff sometimes spend hundreds of staff hours reconstructing trad-
ing in a single case, only to find that the timing, price, and other available data
are not sufficiently precise to prove that the suspected trading abuses occurred,
but also are so ambiguous that staff can not disprove such abuses.
A principal reason many current reconstructions are unable to prove or dis-
prove suspected trading abuses is because of price repetition within the time
frame in which suspect trades are narrowed. Because of the volume of transac-
tions, speed, and volatility of commodities trading, prices often recur, even
within relatively short time periods. Consequently, even though order tickets
and other data (e.g., order tickets from members on the other side of the trade,
and the time and sales register) sometimes may narrow the period in which a
trade occurred to five minutes or less, unless the trade price occurred uniquely
within that time period, often it is not possible to reconstruct trading accurately
and precisely. The usefulness of the data obtained is inversely related to the
ambiguities created by price repetition. The Commission found that a signifi-
cant reduction in price repetition and such ambiguities does not occur unless
the actual time of execution is established in one minute increments.
Id. at 31,540.
90. See CFTC Division of Trading and Markets, Rule Enforcement Review of the
Chicago Board of Trade 55-56 (Feb. 17, 1989) [hereinafter Rule Enforcement Review].
91. See id. at 54-61.
92. See id. passim (CFTC report on Chicago Board of Trade efficiency); Berg,
C.F T.C. Criticizes Exchange, N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1989, at Dl, col. 3 (CFTC criticized
Chicago Board of Trade for lack of effectiveness).
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many trades were missing time bracket designations, that time stamps on
floor orders were sometimes missing, and that other entry information
was sometimes in error. The Commission also discovered that trades
were often bracketed incorrectly. The Division of Trading and Markets
recommended that the Chicago Board of Trade improve the CTR sys-
tem.93 Subsequently, the Chicago Board of Trade announced several
changes in the system, including a reduction of its bracketing period
from 30 minutes to 15 minutes.94 In contrast to these findings, a CFTC
staff review conducted before public disclosure of the FBI sting operation
found that the time input system of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange
was a generally effective system, and that the exchange had an adequate
audit trail system.95 Like the Chicago Board of Trade's CTR, the Chi-
cago Mercantile Exchange employed a computerized system that im-
puted times of execution by a mathematical formula.96 The CFTC,
however, did recommend various improvements in the Chicago Mercan-
tile Exchange's CTR system.97
3. Dual Trading
During the hearings on the CFTC Act of 1974, the Administrator of
the Commodity Exchange Authority said that floor brokers should be
prohibited from trading for their own accounts while executing orders
from customers, except where such a prohibition would unduly restrict
the liquidity of trading or hinder the execution of customer orders.98
"Prohibiting floor brokers from trading for their own accounts or for
accounts in which they have an interest when they also are executing
trades for customers would eliminate the possible conflict of interest now
present when they are permitted to trade for customers and for their
personal accounts." 99
93. See Rule Enforcement Review, supra note 90, at 101-04.
94. See CBOT Board Approves Further Surveillance Enhancements, Chicago Board of
Trade News Release, Mar. 3, 1989; see also CBOT to Set Up New Surveillance by Fall,
Investor's Daily, Mar. 6, 1989 (CBOT to implement system changes, including reduction
in bracketing periods from 30 minutes to 15 minutes); Chicago Board of Trade Plans
Surveillance Steps, Wall St. J., Mar. 6, 1989, at C12, col. 6 (same); Berg, Chicago Board
Acts on Its Timing, N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1989, at 37, col. 3 (same). The Chicago Board of
Trade also proposed requiring that members' trading cards be picked up at one hour
intervals, that all trading cards be time-stamped by the exchange as they are taken from
the floor, and that trades be submitted to the exchange within one hour after the trading
cards have been collected for clearing. See CBOT Board Approves Further Surveillance
Enhancements, Chicago Board of Trade News Release, Mar. 3, 1989; see also CBOT To
Set Up New Surveillance By Fall, Investor's Daily, Mar. 6, 1989, at 21 (discussing addi-
tional regulations to enhance internal surveillance); Chicago Board of Trade Plans Sur-
veillance Steps, Wall St. J., Mar. 6, 1989, at C12, col. 6; Berg, Chicago Board Acts on Its
Timing, N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1989, at 37, col. 3.
95. See CFTC Division of Trading and Markets, Audit Trail Rule Enforcement Re-
view of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange 67-68 (Sept. 27, 1988).
96. See id. at 3.
97. See id. at 3-5.
98. See H.R. Rep. No. 975, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1974).
99. Id. at 50-51. The witness for the Commodity Exchange Authority recommended
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Congress did not adopt such a trading prohibition, but the CFTC Act
of 1974 required the CFTC to determine whether floor brokers should be
allowed to engage in dual trading.l"o The statute further provided that if
the CFTC determined that dual trading should be permitted, the Com-
mission was to specify the terms and conditions under which it would be
conducted. In making those determinations, the CFTC was required to
consider the effect on each affected market's trading liquidity. In addi-
tion, the Commission was allowed to make separate determinations for
each contract market as to whether dual trading should be permitted.'0 1
that exchanges be required to adopt written rules designed to protect the interests of
customers in the limited situations where dual trading was needed to assure liquidity on
the floor of the exchange. See id. at 50. In a separate report the Subcommittee on Special
Small Business Problems of the Permanent Select Committee on Small Business had rec-
ommended the elimination of dual trading. See Evans, Report of the Subcommittee on
Special Small Business Problems of The Permanent Select Committee on Small Business,
H.R. Rep. No. 963, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 52-54 (1974).
100. See 7 U.S.C. § 6j (1974). In connection with this legislation, the Comptroller
General informed the Chairman of the House Agriculture Committee that
[b]ecause of the inherent conflict of interest wherein a broker may in one in-
stance be trading for a customer's account and in the next instance trading for
his personal account, we believe that such practices should be closely regulated.
We note that the Securities and Exchange Commission regulations do not per-
mit a member of a national securities exchange to initiate, while on the ex-
change floor, any transaction in any security trading on the exchange for any
account which he has discretion over or in which he has an interest.
CFTC Program Study Group, Report for the Commodity Futures Trading Commission:
Dual Trading by Floor Brokers and FCM's, Projects No. 203-a and 203-b, at 2 (Feb. 4,
1975) (quoting Letter from the Comptroller General to the Chairman of the House Agri-
culture Committee (Feb. 13, 1974)). The reference by the Comptroller General to SEC
regulations concerned the SEC's effort over several years to limit floor trading. See, e.g.,
SEC, Report on the Feasibility and Advisability of the Complete Segregation of the Func-
tions of Dealer and Broker 109-14 (1936) (recommendation to prohibit dual trading);
Report of the Special Study of Securities Markets of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., Part 4, at 5-7, 166 (1963) (discussing
SEC regulations concerning dual trading). See generally J. Seligman, The Transforma-
tion of Wall Street 327-35 (1982) (discussing studies of floor trading and SEC's attempts
to limit it).
101. See 7 U.S.C. § 6j (1974). The statute required the CFTC to make this determina-
tion within nine months after the effective date of the Act, and subsequently upon deter-
mination that changes were necessary. Specifically, the CFTC was to determine
whether or not a floor broker may trade for his own account or any account in
which such broker has trading discretion, and also execute a customer's order
for future delivery and, if the Commission determines that such trades and such
executions shall be permitted, the Commission shall further determine the
terms, conditions, and circumstances under which such trades and such execu-
tions shall be conducted: Provided, That any such determination shall, at a
minimum, take into account the effect upon liquidity of trading of each market:
And provided further, That nothing herein shall be construed to prohibit the
Commission from making separate determinations for different contract mar-
kets when such are warranted in the judgment of the Commission, or to pro-
hibit contract markets from setting terms and conditions more restrictive than
those set by the Commission.
7 U.S.C. § 6j(1) (1974). The Act required the CFTC to make a similar determination
about trading conducted by a brokerage firm. See 7 U.S.C. § 6j(2) (1974).
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Initially, the CFTC staff conducted an internal review of dual trad-
ing1"2 and created the Advisory Committee on Market Regulation to
consider the issue." 3 The Advisory Committee concluded that dual
trading was necessary to provide liquidity in the marketplace and that
the practice promoted expertise among floor brokers."° The Committee
believed, however, that additional regulations were needed to control po-
tential abuses, and it urged the CFTC to conduct a study of time-stamp-
ing mechanisms that would permit more precise recording of the time of
execution of trades in order to detect abuses.' 05 The Committee further
recommended that a study be made of the liquidity provided by dual
trading. 106
On December 12, 1975, the CFTC proposed regulations that would
have required all contract markets that wished to continue to permit dual
trading to adopt CFTC approved regulations governing such trading.
The Commission proposed banning dual trading by floor brokers after
January 16, 1977 on any contract market that had not submitted a plan
to record order executions which permitted reconstruction of the se-
quence for futures transactions executed on the exchange. 1 7 The CFTC,
however, never adopted this requirement.10
Instead, the CFTC concluded that the exchanges should adopt certain
minimum standards for dual traders.109 Some of the requirements
102. See generally CFTC Program Study Group, Report for the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission-Dual Trading by Floor Brokers and FCM's, Projects No. 203-a
and No. 203-b (Feb. 4, 1975) [hereinafter Dual Trading by Floor Brokers] (investigation
of dual trading and recommendations).
103. See Proposed Dual Trading Regulations, supra note 9, at 20,842-43 (discussing
Advisory Committee recommendations).
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. As discussed above, the CFTC eventually required exchanges to adopt programs
that identify trade executions within one minute, but it did not tie this requirement to
dual trading.
An early CFTC study group stated that "[i]t seems obvious that if on a particular
exchange floor brokers do not have sufficeint [sic] time to record time of execution, it
must follow that trading thereon is in such volume that liquidity thereon would not be
reduced if dual trading were prohibited." Dual Trading by Floor Brokers, supra note 102,
at 8. In other words, the CFTC argued that if dual trading was needed to assure suffi-
cient liquidity in the pit then the trading volume could not be so high as to impair the
ability to time-stamp trades. On the other hand, if there was so much liquidity that time-
stamping was not possible, then it did not seem that dual trading was necessary. See id.
at 8; see also Letter from James M. Stone, Chairman CFTC, to Congressman Ed Jones 10
(Feb. 23, 1982) (on file at Fordham Law Review) (balancing need for time-stamping
against interest in maintaining market liquidity). The House of Representatives has
passed a bill that would allow dual trading only in pits with low volume. See H.R. Rep.
No. 236, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 2-97 (1989); infra note 237 and accompanying text.
109. See 17 C.F.R. § 155.2 (1988). The CFTC stated that:
Although the Commission is continuing its study of dual trading, and
although the extent of the actual abuses of dual trading by floor brokers cannot
be determined until some adequate method of reconstructing the sequence of
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adopted were based on agency principles. Other restrictions considered
but not adopted, such as a prohibition against "prearranged trading and
other illegal noncompetitive trading," were viewed as already being vio-
lations of the existing Commodity Exchange Act and regulations
thereunder. 110
On December 23, 1976, the CFTC adopted regulations that required
the exchanges to enact specified rules to prevent such trading prac-
tices.1" Some of the requirements adopted were intended to prohibit
floor brokers from purchasing or selling futures contracts for their own
accounts while holding customer orders executable at the market price or
at the price at which such purchase or sale could be made for the floor
broker's own account. 2 The CFTC adopted this regulation to prevent
floor brokers from placing their personal interests ahead of their custom-
ers' when exercising trading discretion over customer accounts. 113 The
prohibition did not extend to accounts where the floor broker's discretion
floor trades is implemented, the Commission believes that, because of the possi-
ble conflict of interests which is inherent in dual trading, such trading should be
permitted only if it is subject to a regulatory program which includes certain
minimum standards ....
Proposed Dual Trading Regulations, supra note 9, at 20,843.
110. See id. at 20,843 & n.6. These regulations also addressed frontrunning or trading
ahead of customer orders, where a dual trading floor broker, with a customer's order in
hand, executes an order for his personal account ahead of the customer's order. See
Trade Time-Sequencing Standards and Exchange Audit Trail Systems, [1984-1986
Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) S 22,450, at 29,970 (Dec 27, 1984). Front-
running was thus equated with trading ahead. See id. Frontrunning may also take other
forms. See Markham, "Front-Running"---Insider Trading Under the Commodity Ex-
change Act, 38 Cath. U.L. Rev. 69, 83-92 (1989). Prearranged trading includes the situa-
tion in which a dual trading floor broker allocates favorable trades to his personal
account or other accounts he controls, rather than to those of his customers. See Trade
Time-Sequencing Standards and Exchange Audit Trail Systems, [1984-1986 Transfer
Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) T 22,450, at 29,970 (Dec. 27, 1984). Other forms of
targeted trading abuses included bucketing or offsetting customer orders, as when a dual
trading floor broker takes the opposite side of a customer's order into his own account or
where a third account is used, resulting in the floor broker's account trading opposite a
customer's account. See id. Wash trading also concerned the CFTC. Wash trading is
the practice of entering into a transaction for the purpose of giving the appearance that
purchases and sales are being made without actually taking a bona fide position in the
market. See id.
111. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 155.2 (1988) (prohibiting prearranged dual trading). In
adopting these requirements, the CFTC did not make dual trading contingent upon time-
stamping. Instead, the CFTC stated that it was making an interim determination to per-
mit dual trading while it gathered information necessary to determine whether dual trad-
ing abuses were of a magnitude that dual trading should be banned. See Dual Trading
Regulations; Trading Standards, supra note 48, at 21,290-91. In deciding whether to
allow dual trading to continue, the CFTC considered a report by its Advisory Committee
on Regulation of Contract Markets and Self-Regulatory Associations, and a report pre-
pared by two advisory committee members. The CFTC also received the testimony of
more than thirty witnesses. See id.
112. See 17 C.F.R. § 155.2(a) (1988).
113. See Dual Trading Regulations; Trading Standards, supra note 48, at 21,294. "Sim-
ply stated, the newly adopted regulation is intended to require that under all circum-
stances the customer must come first." Id.
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was simply limited to such matters as the selection of the precise time
and price at which an order originated by the customer was executed, as
in the case of a "not held" order.114
Although the requirements sought to prevent floor brokers from tak-
ing the best trades for their own accounts, the CFTC noted that there
may be instances where a floor broker must allocate trades, as where the
broker holds ten individual orders calling for the purchase of one con-
tract each in the same commodity and delivery month. The floor broker
could fill those orders almost simultaneously at different prices. In such
instances, the executions at the lower price intervals should be assigned
to the first orders received by the floor broker. Any other non-random
assignment would constitute the discretionary allocation of trades among
accounts which the CFTC regulations sought to prevent.115
The CFTC also required that contract markets adopt provisions to
preclude floor brokers from disclosing the orders of their customers.116
The CFTC stated that the prohibition against disclosure must be inter-
preted in light of its underlying purpose: "to prohibit a floor broker from
disclosing customer orders to other persons who may take advantage of
that knowledge."'1 7 The CFTC noted, however, that certain disclosures
may take place in the normal course of a floor broker's legitimate busi-
ness, as where a brokerage firm requests a status report on orders which
it has previously placed with the floor broker.1" 8
The CFTC also prohibited brokers from knowingly taking the opposite
side of an order placed by someone with whom the broker has a relation-
ship.'19 This requirement is similar to those of Section 4b 12° of the Com-
114. See id. at 21,295. The CFTC has interpreted the scope of this discretionary trad-
ing authority. See Interpretive Statement and Specification of Terms and Conditions for
Certain Exemptions, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,441,
at 21,797-99 (July 7, 1977). The CFTC allows floor brokers discretion over the delivery
month, in addition to time and price discretion. See Interpretation of Discretion Avail-
able to Floor Brokers with Regard to Hand-Off Requirements, [1980-1982 Transfer
Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 21,358, at 25,680-81 (Mar. 16, 1982).
A "not-held" order is generally an order in which the broker is given time and place
discretion but is not responsible for losses. See T. Hieronymus, Economics of Futures
Trading 63 (1977).
115. See Dual Trading Regulations; Trading Standards, supra note 48, at 21,295 n.13.
The CFTC subsequently changed its rules to allow exchanges to promulgate regulations
establishing appropriate allocation systems. See Proposed Rule Changes to Reg. § 155.2
to Eliminate Prohibition Against Allocation of Trades, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,442, at 21,802 (July 7, 1977). This provision was subse-
quently adopted. See 17 C.F.R. § 155.2(g) (1988).
116. See 17 C.F.R. § 155.2(d) (1988).
117. Dual Trading Regulations Trading Standards, supra note 48, at 21,295.
118. See id.
119. See 17 C.F.R. § 155.2(e) (1988).
120. See 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1982). Section 4b is the principal antifraud provision of the -
Commodity Exchange Act. See 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1982). See generally In re Wilkins, 2
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,390, at 35,699 (Jan. 26, 1989) (discussing broker taking
opposite side of customer order as violation of § 4b).
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modity Exchange Act and existing Regulations 1.38121 and 1.39.122 An
exchange prohibition against prearranged trading 123 was also imposed to
supplement Regulation 1.38,124 which required transactions to be exe-
cuted openly and competitively by open outcry on the floor of an
exchange. 125
The CFTC decided not to adopt regulations that would have required
floor brokers to use due diligence in executing customer orders.1 26 In-
stead, the Commission stated that it would consider that issue in the con-
text of future rulemaking efforts which, subsequently, required registered
persons to use due diligence in supervising their employees. The CFTC
also noted that floor brokers were already implicitly obligated to exercise
due diligence in all of their activities on behalf of customers. 127
C. Trade Practice Issues
1. The Tax Trading Scandals and the First Chicago
Grand Jury Inquiry
Long before 1982, traders used the commodity futures market as a tax
shelter through tax straddles. 28 A trader wishing to defer gains or to
convert short-term gains into long-term capital gains would purchase the
right to buy a commodity under a futures contract in a particular deliv-
ery month. At the same time, the trader could sell the same futures con-
tract with a different delivery month. If commodity prices thereafter
dropped uniformly in both contracts, the futures customer would have a
gain in one leg of the transaction and a loss in the other. To illustrate,
assume that a trader entered into a futures contract to sell 5,000 ounces
121. 17 C.F.R. § 1.38 (1988). This regulation requires that all purchases and sales of
futures contracts be "executed openly and competitively by open outcry or posting of bids
and offers or by other equally open and competitive means, in the trading pit or ring or
similar place provided by the contract market, during the regular hours prescribed by the
contract market for trading" futures contracts. See 17 C.F.R. § 1.38(a) (1988).
122. 17 C.F.R. § 1.39 (1988). Regulation 1.39 governs how a broker is to execute
opposing buy and sell orders of different customers that meet each other for execution.
See Dual Trading Regulations; Trading Standards, supra note 48, at 21,295; see also
CFTC Interpretive Letter No. 77-18, Interpretations of Section 4b(d) Regarding Affili-
ated Floor Brokers and FCM's, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
1 20,508, at 22,101-03 (Oct. 21, 1977) (discussing crossing customer orders with proprie-
tary accounts).
123. See 17 C.F.R. § 155.2(f) (1988).
124. 17 C.F.R. § 1.38 (1988).
125. See Dual Trading Regulations; Trading Standards, supra note 48, at 21,295. See
also infra notes 200-207 and accompanying text (discussing CFTC regulation of noncom-
petitive trading).
126. See Dual Trading Regulations; Trading Standards, supra note 48, at 21,297.
127. See Adoption of Customer Protection Rules, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm.
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,642, at 22,625 & n.5 (July 19, 1978); Proposed Standards of
Conduct for Commodity Trading Professionals for the Protection of Customers, [1977-
1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,474, at 21,936-37 (Sept. 6, 1977);
Dual Trading Regulations; Trading Standards, supra note 48, at 21,297.
128. See generally J. Markham, supra note 9, at 153-56, 207-08 (discussing tax strad-
dles and how they work).
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of silver at $10 with delivery to be in March; such a tactic is called going
short. At the same time, the trader agreed to buy 5,000 ounces of silver
at $10.10 with delivery to be in November. The trader, in the second
transaction, was going long. 129 Assume silver prices subsequently rose
$1.00 in both contracts. The trader would then have a gain of $5,000 in
the long transaction and an offsetting $5,000 loss in the short leg. In the
short transaction, he was agreeing to sell something that was worth more
than what he had agreed to sell it for and, in the long transaction, he had
agreed to buy something that was worth more than what he had agreed
to pay for it.130
If the taxpayer then liquidated the short leg in which there was a loss,
he would realize a loss for tax purposes. If he offset the gain from the
profitable leg of the transaction in the following tax year, the overall re-
sult would be a loss in the first year that could be used to offset other
income or to convert income into long-term capital gain, while the over-
all transaction had no real economic effect.131
129. The higher price for the November delivery reflects a phenomenon known as
"contango." Generally, a futures contract with a more distant delivery date will trade at
a higher price than a futures contract with a nearer term delivery date. The difference is
attributable to theoretical storage charges and interest costs. See id. at 208; CFTC, Glos-
sary of Some Terms Commonly Used in the Futures Trading Industry (1979).
130. See J. Markham, Commodities Regulation: Fraud, Manipulation and Other
Claims § 14.01, at 14-1 to 14-2 (1988). The CFTC has described a spread as follows:
The term spread (with its variants "switch," "straddle" and "exchange") is
used generally by the industry to describe the purchase of one future against the
sale of another future of equal size, where both futures are in the same or re-
lated commodities. This purchase and sale constitute the two "legs" of the
spread. A significant, although not the only, impetus to spread trading is the
expectation that the difference in the prices of these two legs (called the "differ-
ential" or "point spread") will either narrow or widen to approach what the
market considers to be the appropriate differential at a subsequent point in time.
For this reason spread trading appears to serve the constructive purpose of
keeping the prices for various months aligned and offers other advantages to
hedgers.
A spread may be executed in one of two ways: By "trading the differential,"
or by "legging in" or "legging on." The term "trading the differential" refers
to the practice of providing a bid or offer on the size of the differential. Accept-
ance of this quote results in the simultaneous purchase of I month and sale of
another at the agreed-upon differential. One trades the differential in the
"spread market," a reference not to a physically separate market but rather to a
manner of executing both legs simultaneously at a differential.
The terms "legging in" or "legging on" refer to the practice of obtaining the
legs of the spread one at a time.
Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Spread Trading, [1977-1980 Transfer
Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCII) 20,643, at 22,626-27 (July 24, 1978); see 80 Cong.
Rec. 8089 (1936).
131. As the Seventh Circuit stated in United States v. Winograd:
The key to the transaction is to liquidate the loss-bearing account or "leg" dur-
ing the first tax year or in the short-term, and to liquidate the gain-bearing
account or "leg," if possible, in the following tax year or in the long-term. The
legs are usually immediately reestablished for future months, thus "rolling
over" the transaction. If all goes as expected, the losses should nearly or exactly
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If done legitimately, the tax straddle was an acceptable means of defer-
ring taxes. 132 Not all traders, however, wanted to engage in legitimate
tax straddles because they presented a risk that actual trading losses
could be incurred that would not offset the tax benefits of a transaction.
For example, if silver prices reversed themselves after liquidating the loss
transaction, the trader could have an actual economic loss that would not
be offset by the liquidated leg of the transaction. To legitimately fore-
close this possibility, traders would, after liquidating the loss leg, reestab-
lish a similar leg, which would continue to offset any further changes in
futures prices. In the following year, the trader could then liquidate both
legs and thereby avoid the possibility of large losses.133
Nevertheless, there remains a small risk of loss between the liquidation
of the first leg and its reestablishment. In addition, variations in silver
prices between different delivery months could actually result in a loss or,
if a trader was lucky, an outright gain. Possible price fluctuations moti-
vated so-called spread or straddle traders to profit from changes between
delivery months. These changes were caused by events that might not
affect all prices the same way because of differing perceptions of the long-
term effects of the events. ' 3  To negate such risks in tax straddles, trad-
ers sometimes engaged in illegal wash transactions by entering into buy
and sell transactions in the same commodity for the same delivery
month. These wash sales effectively eliminated the risk of price varia-
tions in the liquidation and reestablishment of the loss legs.13 1
Tax straddle traders also engaged in transactions that were fictitious
and prearranged to ensure that no outright losses occurred.' 36 These
transactions sometimes took the form of round-robin or rollover tax
equal the gains and thus there would be no real economic impact on the inves-
tor. Beneficial tax treatment results, however, when... the short term "losses"
shelter other unrelated short-term gains in the first year, in effect converting the
amount which would have been short-term gain in the first year into gain in the
second year.
United States v. Winograd, 656 F.2d 279, 281 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989
(1982).
132. See Landreth v. Commissioner, 859 F.2d 643 (9th Cir. 1988); Winograd, 656 F.2d
at 281; King v. Commissioner, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
V 23,392, at 33,055 (T.C. Dec. 2, 1986); United States v. Atkins, [1986-1987 Transfer
Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,706, at 33,844 (S.D.N.Y. June 2, 1987); see also
DeMartino v. Commissioner, 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCII) 24,372, at 35,597 (2d Cir.
Nov. 23, 1988) (losses incurred in crude oil futures by virtue of sham agreement not
recognized for federal tax purposes); Yosha v. Commissioner, 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 24,368, at 35,573 (7th Cir. Nov. 8, 1988) (disallowing deduction where tax
straddle designed solely to avoid tax liability); Forseth v. Commissioner, 845 F.2d 746
(7th Cir. 1988) (straddle transactions were shams and thus deduction of tax losses
disallowed).
133. See Winograd, 656 F.2d at 281.
134. See supra notes 129-130.
135. See, e.g., In re Jean Goldwurm, 7 Agric. Dec. 265 (CEA 1948); cases cited infra
notes 149-202.
136. See United States v. Winograd, 656 F.2d 279, 281 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 989 (1982).
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spreads. In these prearranged transactions, three exchange members en-
gaged in multiple round-robin transactions in particular futures con-
tracts. The buy and sell orders for these transactions, entered
simultaneously on the floor, were generally for large blocks of futures in
illiquid delivery months. Because of their simultaneous entry, large size
and the illiquidity of the contracts, the participants usually were assured
that their prearranged buy and sell orders would be matched. The first
round of those transactions resulted in large tax losses to participants in
the current tax year. In the next tax year, however, the round-robin
transactions were reversed so that the prior year's loss was, for the most
part, recovered as a taxable gain. Predictably, a similar but greater series
of such transactions would be conducted in subsequent tax years to cre-
ate tax losses to apply against the gains from the prior rollover tax
spreads and from other trading activities.'37
Tax straddle traders also sometimes manipulated prices in illiquid
commodity markets to acquire the necessary gains and losses and to pro-
tect against actual outright losses. 3 ' These and other fraudulent trading
practices became the subject of several CFTC enforcement actions.' 39
The CFTC was also responsible for the institution of grand jury proceed-
ings in New York and Chicago."4 Numerous criminal indictments were
137. Such activities were also conducted in the securities options markets. See Ex-
change Act of 1934, Release No. 14330 (Jan. 3, 1978).
For an illustration of how this can be done, see chart A on page 26 (not based on actual
trades or prices).
In this illustration, each of the three brokers traded soybean contracts with January,
April and July delivery dates. In the first set of transactions executed on November 1,
each of the traders established a two hundred lot straddle position in soybeans. Thereaf-
ter, on December 1, each of the traders liquidated one leg of the transaction to establish a
loss. At the same time, a new leg was created for each trader to protect the straddle. The
traders set prices at levels they had previously agreed to so as to guarantee a uniform loss
of minus three for each leg of the transaction. Thereafter, on January 10, the straddles
were liquidated at prices that offset the prior losses. It should be noted that this sample is
perfectly symmetrical and involves price relationships that are not likely to occur. In an
actual transaction, the price differences would likely be much smaller and there could
even be small variations that create profit or losses designed to conceal the fictitious na-
ture of the transaction, or to pass profits on to brokers for accommodating the trades. In
In re Gimbel, 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) t 24,213, at 35,004 (Apr. 14, 1988), three
traders participated in prearranged transactions in which each trader initiated trades with
the understanding that it would be matched so that, when the transactions were com-
plete, the traders would have no market position and the net financial position of the
group would be zero. See Lasker v. Bear Steams & Co., 757 F.2d 15, 17 (2d Cir. 1985)
(customer sued brokerage house for speculative tax benefits); Note, The Tax Straddle
Cases, 1982 Duke L.J. 114, 116-25 (discussing several tax straddle incidents); Note, Tax-
ation: Commodity Straddles as an Income Sheltering Device, 31 Okla. L. Rev. 233, 235-39
(1978) (detailed discussion of commodity tax straddles).
138. See United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 770-71 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1077 (1981).
139. See J. Markham, supra note 9, at 153-56.
140. Newspaper reports concerning the grand jury in Chicago sound eerily similar to
the recent reports on the FBI sting operations. For example, a 1976 Wall Street Journal
article said:
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returned in both cities.14 1 Investigators also discovered that the Com-
modity Exchange Inc. ("Comex") in New York had special trading rules
that allowed straddles to be established in after-hours trading at any
price that occurred during the trading range of the day, ensuring price
fluctuations for tax purposes. The CFTC later prohibited this
practice. 142
In Chicago, grand juries indicted several soybean traders and in New
York over forty traders were the subject of enforcement actions, all aris-
ing out of passing money, fraudulent trading and tax straddles. 4 3 In one
Chicago case, United States v. La Mantia,'4 however, a district court
held that the term "fictitious sale" in Section 4c of the Commodity Ex-
change Act was unconstitutionally vague. 45
The CFTC's concern about tax straddles resulted in the passage of the
The two-month-old federal grand jury investigating soybean trading on the
Chicago Board of Trade has found evidence of fictitious, prearranged trading by
exchange floor traders and others, sources close to the investigation say....
[I]nsiders say that criminal indictments are possible for offenses ranging from
income-tax fraud and evasion to violations of the Commodity Exchange Act.
In recent weeks the investigation has widened to trading in other commodi-
ties on the Board of Trade and trading on the Chicago Mercantile Ex-
change....
For one thing, until recently, fictitious trades were relatively easy for floor
traders to pull off, insiders say. Trades for their own account aren't time-
stamped and immediately reported as are those executed on behalf of brokerage
house customers and commercial hedgers. Also commodity exchange ticker
tapes report only price changes and not individual trades.
Thus traders operating together can rig an instant trading profit or loss by
simultaneously taking a position and reversing it, based on futures prices that
actually occurred earlier in the trading day. In contrast to legitimate trades, the
transaction is without risk because the traders aren't subject to the vagaries of
the market. The traders set in advance both the price at which the trade is
made and reversed. Typically such trading is done off the floor for privacy.
Laing, U.S. Study of Soybean Trading is Seen Leading to Tax-Law, Other Indictments,
Wall St. J., Aug. 9, 1976, at 18, col. 2. Compare id. with articles cited supra notes 1-5.
141. These indictments were for passing money, fraudulent trading and illegal tax
straddles. See, e.g., Sundheimer v. CFTC, 688 F.2d 150, 153 (2d Cir. 1982) (floor brokers
indicted for knowingly aiding in preparation of fraudulent tax return), cert. denied, 460
U.S. 1022 (1983); United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 771 (2d Cir. 1980) (illegal tax
straddle), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1077 (1981); United States v. La Mantia, [1977-1980
Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,667, at 22,716 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 9, 1978)
(defendant indicted for role in fictitious sales and fraudulent tax return preparation); J.
Markham, supra note 9, at 156 (discussing tax straddle cases).
142. See 45 Fed. Reg. 43,820, 43,820-24 (June 30, 1980); 46 Fed. Reg. 23,516, 23,516
(Apr. 27, 1981); 1981 CFTC Ann. Rep. 76; 1980 CFTC Ann. Rep. 119. The Comex
unsuccessfully challenged the CFTC's action in court. See Commodities Exchange Inc.
v. CFTC, 543 F. Supp. 1340 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd, 703 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1983); J.
Markham, supra note 9, at 143.
143. See In re Jules Nordlicht, CFTC Doe. No. 79-31 (Jan. 7, 1981); In re Ralph J.
Hemminger, CFTC Doc. No. 78-6 (Nov. 21, 1977); In re Alfred Perlmutter, CFTC Doc.
No. 79-33 (Dec. 3, 1979); J. Markham, supra note 9, at 155-156.
144. [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,667, at 22,715
(N.D. Il1. 1978).
145. Id. at 22,717.
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Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981,146 which changed the ways in
which commodities futures transactions are taxed. Under the Act, tax
straddles are now taxed at year-end by being marked to their market
price even if the transaction has not been liquidated. If there is an open
gain in one leg of a straddle and a realized loss of the closing of the other
leg, the gain is taxed as if it had been closed. This eliminates the useful-
ness of tax straddles as well as the need for wash sales and other trading
techniques which sought to reduce trading risks.147 Nevertheless, much
of the law concerning prohibited trading practices is based on cases
against traders engaging in tax straddles brought prior to the Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981.
For example, in In re Jean Goldwurm, 4 s the Commodity Exchange
Authority charged that the respondents had engaged in wash and ficti-
tious sales by executing purchase and sale contracts simultaneously to
convert short-term income into long-term capital gains. These transac-
tions were found to be artificial for trading purposes and fictitious be-
cause they were simply matched off against each other. The judicial
officer determined that the Commodity Exchange Act sought to prohibit
such wash sales because they were artificial and not the result of arms-
length trading based on supply and demand. The traders, their brokers
and the floor brokers who handled the orders were held liable. 149
A similar case is In re Thomas Jordan & Co., 10 where wash sales were
conducted in cotton futures contracts on the New Orleans Cotton Ex-
change. The orders at issue in Jordan were reciprocal purchase and sale
transactions that offset each other and washed each other out. The judi-
cial officer ruled that where offsetting purchases and sales are made for
the same customer, no change in ownership takes place because the
trader is buying and selling to himself. Such transactions were held to be
wash sales and fictitious sales.' 51 Similarly, in Peers & Co.,' 52 simultane-
146. Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 §§ 501-09 (1981) (codified as amended at 26
U.S.C. § 1256 (1986)).
147. See generally 2 T. Russo, Regulation of the Commodity Futures and Options
Markets § 15.01, at 15-2 (Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 designed to thwart illegal
tax avoidance schemes); Lee, The Taxation of Commodity Straddles Under the Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981, 28 Prac. Law. 11, 12-13 (1982) (illustrating tax avoidance
opportunities which Act sought to foreclose).
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 apparently did not stop all futures trading
abuses for tax purposes. The CFTC and grand jury probe in New York is apparently
focusing on wash trades and possibly other forms of tax motivated illegal transactions.
See, e.g., Power & Siconolfi, Key Traders Face Glare of Inquiry, Wall St. J., May 8, 1989,
at Cl, col. 6 (detailing investigation into prearranged trading, frontrunning and wash
sales to avoid taxes); Eichenwald, Commodity Inquiry Said to Have a Second Focus, N.Y.
Times, May 6, 1989, at 43, col. 3 (discussing investigation into frontrunning on New
York commodities exchanges); Eichenwald, New York Commodity Inquiry, N.Y. Times,
May 5, 1989, at Dl, col. 6 (reporting investigation of N.Y. brokers and traders).
148. 7 Agric. Dec. 265 (1948).
149. See id. at 280-81.
150. 7 Agric. Dec. 381 (1948).
151. See id. at 384-86.
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ous purchase and sale orders for two firms controlled by a single individ-
ual were held to be wash sales and fictitious sales. 153
Later CFTC cases paralleled the Commodity Exchange Authority
opinions. For example, in In re Siegel Trading Co.,"' the CFTC charged
that fictitious tax straddles were conducted in order to shelter some
$500,000 through a butterfly straddle in Mexican peso futures on a Chi-
cago exchange. In a butterfly straddle, the trader is long in one delivery
month and short half of the number of long futures in both a prior and a
subsequent delivery month; the goal is to reduce risks caused by fluctua-
tions in different delivery months. The butterfly straddle in Siegel in-
volved 1,000 contracts. On several occasions parts of the straddle were
lifted so that losses could be realized on the losing legs. On each occa-
sion a new leg was established to protect against the deterioration of the
offsetting profits on the opposing side of the transaction. In the following
year, a 2,000 contract straddle was established. This practice was not
uncommon as traders had to increase the size of their straddles each year
to carry over the current and previous gains. This straddle was offset six
months and one day after it was established.
The CFTC charged that the trades were fictitious and prearranged and
not subject to competitive bidding on the floor of the exchange. The
Commission found that the broker had offset and taken the opposite side
of the customer's orders to carry out the straddle without risk, and that
he had bucketed orders. The broker thus became the buyer of the cus-
tomer's short positions and the seller of the customer's long positions.
Wash sale violations were also found based upon the analysis employed
in Goidwurm.1' The CFTC found that in lifting and reestablishing the
legs of the straddle, the trades were opened and closed at substantially
the same price and that the transactions were prearranged and executed
in a noncompetitive manner. The Commission found that the parties
had engaged in other prohibited practices, including the passing of profits
from floor broker accounts to the customer. The CFTC found that pass-
ing money was not a legitimate method of trading and held this conduct
to be wash and fictitious trading. 156
2. Prohibited Trading Practices
The CFTC has also pursued floor trading abuses outside the area of
152. 13 Agric. Dec. 597 (1954).
153. See id. at 601-02; see also In re John T. Lyons, 26 Agric. Dec. 221 (1967) (brokers
buying from and selling to each other the same amount at same price held to be wash
sales or fictitious sales).
154. [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,452, at 21,827
(C.F.T.C. July 26, 1977), proceedings stayed, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) 20,862, at 23,532 (C.F.T.C. July 27, 1979).
155. In re Jean Goldwurm, 7 Agric. Dec. 265, 276 (1948).
156. See In re Siegel Trading Co., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
(CCH) 20,452, at 21,849 (C.F.T.C. July 26, 1977).
1989]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
tax straddles. For example, in CFTC v. Savage 15 7 the CFTC charged
that Jack Savage, a broker on the floor of the Mid-American Commodity
Exchange in Chicago, had defrauded customers through a series of prear-
ranged transactions in which he bought contracts for customer accounts
at a firm that controlled their trading and simultaneously sold futures
contracts for the accounts of other customers. The result was that "Sav-
age sustained losses with respect to [some] customers who had deficits in
their accounts and enjoyed profits on transactions with [other] customers
who had credit balances in their accounts."' 58 The net effect of the
transactions was that Savage's losses and gains were substantially offset,
and customer funds were simply shifted between accounts with deficits
and those with credits. These "Robin Hood" transactions were done in
order to avoid the need to meet CFTC segregation of fund require-
ments. 59 In addition, the Commission charged that Savage had engaged
in other prearranged trades between himself and the customers of the
firm in which he became the buyer with respect to customer sell orders
and the seller with respect to customer buy orders in a manner that as-
sured his profits.
The Ninth Circuit reversed in part an order of summary judgment
against Savage because the CFTC had not shown that Savage intention-
ally had violated the anti fraud provisions of Sections 4b"6° and 4c 6 of
the Act.162 The Ninth Circuit held that the CFTC must show, for pur-
poses of Sections 4b and 4c, that the floor broker's acts were done with
knowledge of their nature and character. In other words, for purposes of
Section 4b the trader must have known that he was cheating, that he was
making a false report, that he was deceiving or that he was taking the
opposite side of the transaction. The court held that knowledge exists
when one acts in careless disregard of whether his acts amount to cheat-
ing or fraud.' 63 Such knowledge, the court ruled, "cannot be precluded
by ignorance brought about by willfully or carelessly ignoring the
truth.""
The court also addressed the provisions of Section 4c that prohibit
wash trading, cross trades, accommodation trading and fictitious sales.' 65
The court noted that Congress viewed such transactions as "pure, un-
157. 611 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1979).
158. See id. at 275.
159. See id. at 275 n.5; Commodity Exchange Act § 4b (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1982
& Supp. V. 1987)) (fund segregation requirements); see also 17 C.F.R. § 1.20 (1988) (seg-
regation of customer funds in certain trust accounts).
160. Commodity Exchange Act § 4b (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1982 &
Supp. V 1987)).
161. Commodity Exchange Act § 4c (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 6c (1982 &
Supp. V 1987)).
162. See CFTC v. Savage, 611 F.2d 270, 283-84 (9th Cir. 1979).
163. See id. at 284.
164. Id. at 283.
165. See Commodity Exchange Act § 4c (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6c (1982 & Supp. V
1987)).
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adulterated fraud" '166 and it cited Goldwurm '67 for the proposition that
the essential characteristic of a wash sale is the intent not to make a
genuine bona fide trade.1 61 On the other hand, "one can not have an
'accommodation' sale or a 'fictitious' transaction if one in fact believes he
is bargaining faithfully and intends to effect a bona fide trade."' 69 Again,
however, "the required knowledge [could] not be eliminated by willfully
or carelessly induced ignorance."'' 0
In another case, In re Citadel Trading Co.,' 71 the CFTC found wash
sales to be a violation of the Commodity Exchange Act.' In Citadel,
two floor brokers had prearranged transactions in customer discretionary
accounts of a brokerage firm. The Commission found that the brokers
executing these transactions entered orders opposite each other in order
to generate commissions." 3 The frequency of the wash result, the rela-
tively short period between the entry and fill of the orders and the inabil-
ity of other traders to garner even a share of the orders also evidenced
that the transactions were prearranged wash sales. Furthermore, the
floor broker who figured in the Savage case had engaged in transactions
with accounts of this brokerage firm so that customers would sustain
losses in their discretionary accounts while Savage was assured of profits.
The CFTC review board found that Savage returned a portion of these
illicit profits in cash to a principal of the brokerage firm.' 4 Because
money returned in such transactions was often carried in a gym bag, the
transactions became known as "bag" trades."7
166. CFTC v. Savage, 611 F.2d at 284 (quoting 80 Cong. Rec. 7905 (1936)) (remarks
of Sen. Smith).
167. In re Jean Goldwurm, 7 Agric. Dec. 265 (1948).
168. See CFTC v. Savage, 611 F.2d at 284.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) % 21,238, at 25,165
(C.F.T.C. Aug. 31, 1981), aff'd, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 23,082, at 32,182 (May 12, 1986).
172. See id. at 25,180.
173. See id. at 25,185.
174. See id. at 25,185-86.
175. The Chicago Sun Times defined a bag trade as follows:
[W]hen markets are volatile, with prices moving quickly, traders sometimes ar-
range schemes in which they fill a customer's order at a price that doesn't reflect
the market. In a typical case, a broker may sell a contract for 5,000 bushels of
soybeans to a colleague for $4 a bushel while prices are moving up. The other
trader then sells the contract at the market price, say $4.05, and pockets the 5
cents-a-bushel profit, for a gain of $250 on the trade. The traders may then
either split the profit or return the favor.
Burns & Greising, Will Probe Outcry Peril Open Outcry?, Chicago Sun Times, Jan. 22,
1989, at 60, col. I.
Bag trades and other fictitious trading practices were also the subject of the indict-
ments recently returned in Chicago. One indictment stated that:
It was further a part of the scheme that the defendants would accommodate one
another in illegal, prearranged trades, sometimes called "bagged" trades, at the
expense of and to the financial detriment of brokers' customers. Traders who
regularly accommodated particular brokers were called "bagmen." The de-
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fendants participated in various illegal and prearranged trades to facilitate the
theft and misappropriation of customer funds and opportunities as follows:
a. Using their knowledge of a customer's order, defendant brokers would
trade ahead of the customer order by arranging with an accommodating
trader for the traders to take a market position prior to the filling of the
customer's order. When the customer's order was then filled, the previ-
ously taken position would be made more profitable. The accommodat-
ing trader would then liquidate the profitable position and transfer a
portion of the profit back to the broker or the broker's designee.
b. Defendant-brokers would arrange with accommodating traders for the
traders to take the opposite side of their customer orders - that is sell
to a buying customer and buy from a selling customer - to misappro-
priate customer profit and opportunity. A portion of the profit would
later be transferred back from the accommodating trader to the broker
or the broker's designee.
c. Defendant-brokers and accommodating traders would arrange for the
traders to take the opposite side of the broker's customer orders in order
to protect the broker against personal liability for customer loss caused
by the broker's failure to execute the customer orders at the appropriate
prices, as well as losses caused by market shifts, out-trades, errors and
omissions. The loss incurred by the accommodating trader would often
be repaid by the broker through later, illegal prearranged ("allocated"),
profitable ("winning") trades at the expense of the broker's other
customers.
d. Defendant-brokers and accommodating traders would arrange for the
traders to engage in prearranged trades to accept losses for brokers' per-
sonal trading activity and other errors which losses the brokers would
later repay to the traders by misappropriating customer profit and mar-
ket opportunity.
e. Defendant-brokers and accommodating traders would arrange for the
traders to take the opposite side of customer orders in prearranged
trades to help the broker fill the order at a price favorable enough to the
customer to allow the broker to maintain the customer order flow, re-
sulting commissions and theft opportunities.
f. Defendant-brokers and accommodating traders would illegally offset
customer orders by placing the traders in the middle of the customer
"buy" and "sell" orders, with the prearranged trades guaranteeing the
accommodating trader a profit, a portion of which would be kicked back
to the defendant-brokers by way of other prearranged trades.
g. Defendant-brokers and accommodating traders would arrange for the
traders to trade out of positions for themselves and brokers on the curb
as long as one hour and fifteen minutes after the close of the market.
h. Defendant-brokers and accommodating traders would arrange for trad-
ers to kickback a varying percentage of misappropriated customer funds
to the broker by placing money into the broker's personal trading ac-
counts and those designated by the brokers. Those illegal funds would
be transferred through illegal prearranged trades, through false out-
trade checks, by cash, and by offset between accommodating traders.
i. Defendant-brokers would manipulate and prearrange trades involving
"price or limit" or "stop" orders in order to assure a fellow broker or
accommodating trader a profitable position while ostensibly filling the
order as instructed, thus denying the customer his right to an opportu-
nity for an execution of the order at the best available price.
j. Defendants would engage in illegal prearranged trades to pass money,
usually stolen customer money, between personal accounts.
United States v. Dempsey, No. 89-666, indictment at 18-20 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 2, 1989).
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In re Murphy 176 involved so-called "ginzy" trades. In a ginzy trade,
traders arrange to take disadvantageous prices on some orders and ad-
vantageous prices on others so that they can effectively trade in half tick
differences. 7 This practice was common in the T-Bond pit on the Chi-
cago Board of Trade. When a ginzy was done at a disadvantageous
price, it was the custom on the floor for the trader experiencing the dis-
advantageous price to receive a subsequent ginzy at an advantageous
price without public outcry. The CFTC held that this was noncompeti-
tive trading in violation of regulation 1.38.178
The Murphy case signaled a new, tough approach by the CFTC to
floor trading abuses. Thereafter, in In re Collins,179 the CFTC held that
a trader engaged in illegal wash trades when he entered simultaneous buy
and sell transactions in commodity futures contracts for the same com-
modity with identical delivery dates. The trader made these trades to
reposition himself in the delivery line, in which traders holding the oldest
positions are given delivery notices first. To avoid this, the trader would
close his position and immediately reestablish the same position so that
he would receive an earlier date on his trades, thereby delaying receipt of
delivery notices. As a result, the trader could stay in the market for a
longer period.' 80 The Commodity Exchange Authority had ruled previ-
ously that such trading was wash trading and the CFTC agreed.' The
Commission also found that the trades were prearranged and fictitious in
violation of the Commodity Exchange Act. 182
In In re Collins, the CFTC also noted that in United States v. La Man-
176. [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) % 22,798, at 31,339
(C.F.T.C. Sept. 25, 1985).
177. Trading had been conducted previously in half tick differences, but changes in the
law made such trading unprofitable. A new innovation, however, has created synthetic
half ticks. Ginzy trades take advantage of these synthetic half tick differences. See J.
Markham, supra note 9, at 175.
178. See In re Murphy, [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) S
22,798, at 31,354 (C.F.T.C. Sept. 25, 1985); see also 17 C.F.R. § 1.38(a) (1988) (prohibit-
ing non-competitive trading). The CFTC recently brought another ginzy case. See In re
John K. Angelo, CFTC Doc. No. 89-5 (filed Apr. 13, 1989). See generally 22 Traders
Face Charges, N.Y. Times Apr. 12, 1989, at D15, col. 5 (discussing Angelo); McMurray,
CFTC Alleges 'Ginzy' Trading by 22 at Board of Trade, Wall St. J., Apr. 11, 1989, at Cl,
col. 2 (same).
179. [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) % 22,982, at 31,896
(C.F.T.C. Apr. 4, 1986), modified, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
(CCH) 23,401, at 33,077 (Nov. 26, 1986), rev'd sub nom. Stoller v. CFTC, 834 F.2d 262
(2d Cir. 1987).
180. See id. at 31,900.
181. See Letter from Douglas Bagnell, Deputy Administrator, Commodity Exchange
Authority, to exchange supervisors and staff of the Commodity Exchange Authority (No-
vember 25, 1955) (discussing trading to delay or avoid delivery) (on file at Fordham Law
Review); Letter from Alex B. Caldwell, Administrator, Commodity Exchange Authority,
to Everette B. Harris, President of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (Sept. 13, 1971)
(discussing Commodity Exchange Authority position on trading to avoid or delay deliv-
ery) (on file at Fordham Law Review).
182. See Collins, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) at 31,901-
03.
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tia 83 a district court had held that the term "fictitious sale" was uncon-
stitutionally vague.18 4 The CFTC, therefore, believed it was appropriate
to provide future guidance as to the meaning of this term. The Commis-
sion stated that the central characteristic of a fictitious sale is "the ap-
pearance of submitting trades to the open market while negating the risk
or price competition incident to such a market."'8 5 The CFTC held that
prearranged trading is a form of fictitious trading." 6 The CFTC also
reversed its earlier position, taken in In re Sundheimer,8 7 that prear-
ranged transactions resulting in actual trades in the pit did not constitute
fictitious trading. 8 s The CFTC held in Collins that the test to determine
whether prearranged trading is a fictitious sale is whether information
such as price and quantity is determined outside the pit and whether the
execution of the transaction in the pit is designed to "shield the private
nature of the bargain from public scrutiny." ' 9 The CFTC asserted that
both price competition and market risks were eliminated in such
circumstances. 190
The CFTC did not apply the views on futures trading expressed in
Collins retroactively to prearranged trading, but it did so with respect to
its finding of the wash sales."9 ' Subsequently, the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange requested clarification of the CFTC's position on wash trading
in Collins.'92 The CFTC replied that a wash trade took place where the
respondent knowingly participated in transactions initiated with the in-
tent to avoid a bona fide market position.193 The exchange was con-
cerned with the practices of "scalpers" on the floor of the exchange who
engage in quick in-and-out trading to obtain small gains and to limit
their losses. These traders often engage in "scratch" trades in which
183. [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,667, at 22,715
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 9, 1978).
184. See In re Collins, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
22,982, at 31,901 (C.F.T.C. Apr. 4, 1986), modified [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm.
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,401, at 33,077 (Nov. 26, 1986), rev'd sub nom. Stoller v. CFTC,
834 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1987).
185. Id. at 31,902.
186. See id. at 31,901-03.
187. [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 21,245, at 25,219
(C.F.T.C. Sept. 16, 1981), aff'd 688 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1022
(1983).
188. See In re Collins, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
22,982, at 31,903 n.23 (C.F.T.C. Apr. 4, 1986) (prearranged trading resulting in actual
trades in pit is fictitious trading), modified, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) at 33,077 (Nov. 26, 1986), rev'd sub nom. Stoller v. CFTC, 834 F.2d 262 (2d
Cir. 1987).
189. Id. at 31,903.
190. See id.
191. See id. at 31,902.
192. See In re Collins, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
23,112, at 32,283 (C.F.T.C. June 18, 1986).
193. See In re Collins, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
23,401, at 33,077 (C.F.T.C. Nov. 26, 1986), rev'dsub noma. Stoller v. CFTC, 834 F.2d 262
(2d Cir. 1987).
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there is no profit or loss. Traders in the Chicago Mercantile Exchange
expressed concern that the CFTC's opinion in Collins could preclude
that type of trading. The CFTC stated that this was not the case. The
CFTC asserted that Collins did not prohibit scratch trades as a form of
wash trades, but said that wash trades were those that involved tech-
niques that gave the appearance of submitting trades to the open market
while eliminating the risk of price competition.' 94
Subsequently, on appeal, the Second Circuit, in Stoller v. CFTC,19
reversed the CFTC on its wash sale holding in Collins. The Second Cir-
cuit found that the CFTC's clarification at the request of the exchange
had not given fair notice of what was a prohibited wash trade and that
the Commodity Exchange Authority's views on the type of trading en-
gaged in by Stoller, the trader involved in Collins, had not been broadly
publicized. The Court also noted that wash trades involved virtually
risk-free transactions which were often prearranged and intentionally
designed to mislead. 196 The transactions in the Collins case were not of
that ilk. Although designed to minimize risk, they served a legitimate
commercial purpose. The Court stated that the subtle distinctions ex-
pressed by the CFTC in its clarifying opinion could not be applied to
Stoller. 197
Undaunted by its setback in Stoller, the CFTC subsequently main-
tained in In re Gimbel198 that it would continue to apply its views as
expressed in Collins.'99 In Gimbel, the CFTC asserted that a prear-
ranged transaction in the pit is a fictitious sale where it appears to be the
result of open outcry but where risk and price competition incident to an
open outcry market are actually negated. 2" The CFTC also stated that a
fictitious transaction need not be structured to negate both market risk
and price competition; it is sufficient if the transaction is structured to
negate price competition or market risk. Price competition or market
risk is negated when it is reduced to a level that has no practical impact
on the transaction.20 In determining whether a prearranged transaction
is present, the CFTC will look at the transaction as a whole and not at its
constituent parts. In this case, each individual trade was initiated with
the understanding that it would be matched. As a result, "when the pre-
arranged transaction was complete, the three traders would have no mar-
ket position and the net financial position of the group would be zero." 20
2
The CFTC's regulatory scheme also prohibits noncompetitive trading.
194. See id. at 33,077-78.
195. Stoller v. CFTC, 834 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1987).
196. See id. at 266.
197. See id. at 266-67.
198. 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,213, at 35,002 (C.F.T.C. Apr. 14, 1988).
199. See id. at 35,003 n.6.
200. See id. at 35,003.
201. See id. at 35,003 n.7.
202. Id. at 35,004.
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Indeed, Regulation 1.38,203 adopted by the CFTC's predecessor, is a cen-
tral element of the federal regulatory efforts. This regulation requires
that all purchases and sales of futures contracts be "executed openly and
competitively by open outcry or posting of bids and offers or by other
equally open and competitive methods, in the trading pit or ring or simi-
lar place provided by the contract market, during the regular hours pre-
scribed by the contract market for trading" futures contracts. 2
For example, in In re Laiken,a°5 the CEA held that Regulation 1.38
was violated where a floor broker received a customer order and handed
it to another floor broker for execution. As soon as the floor broker of-
fered the order, the broker who initially had received the order accepted
it for his own account. Although offered by open outcry, it was found
that the transaction was a sham because no one else had a realistic oppor-
tunity to participate in the transaction.2 °6 The Second Circuit upheld the
decision in Laiken v. United States Department of Agriculture.2 °7
Regulation 1.38 embodies a concept critical to the conduct of com-
modity futures trading: trades must be competitive.2 0 Unfortunately,
the CFTC has apparently equated this desirable goal with a requirement
that there be no discussion or "shopping" of orders before their entry
into the pit.20 9 The CFTC's narrow view of competition guarantees that
the only competition allowed is that of floor brokers, many of whom are
trading for their own account and enjoying the time and place advantage
of a position on the floor where all trades are executed. Those advan-
tages, coupled with dual trading and the lack of an adequate audit trail to
uncover misconduct, foster abuses, reduce competition and give floor
traders significant control over orders flowing into the pits.210
203. 17 C.F.R. § 1.38 (1988).
204. Id.
205. 23 Agric. Dec. 1193 (1964), aff'd, 345 F.2d 784 (2d Cir. 1965).
206. See id. at 1201.
207. 345 F.2d 784 (2d Cir. 1965). The Commodity Exchange Authority found similar
conduct in In re Marks. 20 Agric. Dec. 457 (1961).
208. See 17 C.F.R. § 1.38 (1988).
209. See In re Collins, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
22,982, at 31,903 (C.F.T.C. Apr. 4, 1986), modified, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm.
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 23,401, at 33,078 (Nov. 26, 1986), rev'd sub nom. Stoller v. CFTC,
834 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1987).
210. The term prearranged trading is not contained in the Commodity Exchange Act.
Instead, the statute prohibits "fictitious" trades. See 7 U.S.C. § 6c (1980). The CFTC,
however, has equated prearranged trading with fictitious trading. See Collins, [1986-1987
Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH') at 31,903. This expansive view of prear-
ranged trading does not square with common understanding. As noted in a Chicago Sun
Times article:
Prearranged trading. Traders sometimes illegally meet outside the trading pit
to plan the price or size of trades. By arranging such noncompetitive trades,
they can try to manipulate the price of the trade, or steer business to each other,
freezing out other traders.
Burns & Greising, Will Probe Outcry Peril Open Outcry?, Chicago Sun Times, Jan. 22,
1989, at 60, col. 4. Thus, the key objection to prearranged trading is that it is an effort to
exclude other traders and reduce or eliminate competition. If, however, the trade is exe-
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Large block trades are an area of particular concern in this regard.211
Block trades are large orders entered by institutions that may have an
undue effect on market prices if entered in the trading pit without being
previously positioned with an opposite buyer or seller.212 A large block
trade may drive down prices disproportionately, particularly in illiquid
markets where prior placement may be the only method of execution. 1 3
Realizing that block trades can have such effects, the securities exchanges
have long allowed traders to arrange and negotiate large block trades off
the exchange floors.2" 4 The CFTC, however, has not allowed such block
trading to occur because of its concern that such transactions are by their
very nature prearranged.215
The result is that a block trader who prearranges a trade in securities is
considered to be undertaking the beneficial task of ensuring sufficient li-
quidity in the marketplace and the best possible price is being obtained
for the block trader, as well as precluding an undue effect upon prices
caused by a large block transaction. In contrast, the CFTC deems the
same broker providing the same service to a customer in the commodities
industry to be in violation of a federal law.216
There is no basis for this distinction between securities and commodi-
ties.21 7 Indeed, as a result of the stock market crash of 1987, the SEC
recommended that this disparity in regulation be examined, because
large stock index futures trades could have an adverse effect on securities
cuted competitively in the pit and all traders are allowed to participate, prior negotiations
concerning order size or price would not result in a noncompetitive trade. On the con-
trary, price negotiations could bring additional liquidity into the pit and enhance compe-
tition. See Committee on Futures Regulation of the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York, Large Order Execution in the Futures Markets 19-20 (Jan. 30, 1989) (herein-
after City Bar Association Report); SEC, Recommendations Regarding the October 1987
Market Break 16 (Feb. 3, 1988); cf Petacque & Greising, 'Charades' Played in Pits, Chi-
cago Sun Times, Jan. 27, 1989, at 3, col. 1 (report on allegations that hundreds of trades
faked after being secretly rigged ahead of time).
The indictments in Chicago alleged a broad array of rigged trading devices, including
"curb" trades arranged before or after the close of trading. See, e.g., United States v.
Dempsey, No. 89-666, indictment at 20-21 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 2, 1989).
211. See generally Report of the Special Study of the Options Markets to The Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., Comm. Print 96-IFC 3 at 159
(Dec. 22, 1978) (discussion of block trades); M. Mayer, Markets 282 (1988) (same).
212. Block trades may also have an undue effect on market prices if institutions are not
informed that these orders will be entered on the floor. See City Bar Association Report,
supra note 210, at 7-8; see also Seifert & Turnbull, Institutional Trading Mechanisms in
Futures and Securities, FIA Rev. July-Aug. 1988, at 12, 14.
213. See City Bar Association Report, supra note 210, at 3-6.
214. See id.
215. See id. at 10.
216. See In re Collins [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)II
22,982, at 31,903 (C.F.T.C. Apr. 4, 1986), modified, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm.
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) at 33,077 (Nov. 26, 1986), rev'd sub nom. Stoller v. CFTC, 834 F.2d
262 (2d Cir. 1987).
217. See Norris, Marketplace: Block Trading in Commodities, N.Y. Times, Feb. 14,
1989, at D8, col. 3.
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prices.218
A recent report issued by the Committee on Futures Regulation of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York examined block trading
at length.219 The report noted that the CFTC had considered a form of
"sunshine trading" where orders would be announced prior to their entry
on the floor so that traders could contact customers and seek their partic-
ipation in the trade before the order is entered for execution in the pit.220
The Bar Committee concluded the proposed sunshine trading would not
undermine the purposes of competitive execution.22' The Bar Commit-
tee suggested that the CFTC regulate such trading in a manner similar to
the securities industry, permitting the practice as long as:
1. The size of order eligible for such procedures should be such that:
(a) in view of the liquidity of the particular market, there is a rea-
sonable probability that the order could not be effected without it-
self causing a substantial effect on price; and (b) the order is of a
size typically used by commercial participants;
2. The transaction should have to be bid or offered on the contract
market, by open outcry or other competitive method, with adequate
opportunity for public participation; and
3. Any portion of the transaction that is not promptly taken up at the
ring may be crossed, with the floor broker and/or the FCM [bro-
kerage firm] taking the opposite side (with the consent of the cus-
tomer), but only at the price bid or offered on the contract
market. 22
The Bar Committee noted, however, that the decision on whether a bro-
kerage firm should permit the execution of commodity futures orders in
blocks should be made by the contract market.223 The exchanges object
strongly to block trading. They contend that the practice will ultimately
divert liquidity from the exchanges and that its proponents are large bro-
kerage firms who stand to profit from such large scale trading.224 This is
not inconsistent; typically industry representatives are strong proponents
of block trades, and the exchanges oppose these transactions. Recently,
however, an advisory committee to the Chicago Mercantile Exchange
recommended that the Exchange take steps to facilitate large block or-
ders225 and the Exchange Board of Governors approved such a rule to do
218. See Markham & Stephanz, The Stock Market Crash of 1987-The United States
Looks at New Recommendations, 76 Geo. L.J. 1993, 2041 (1988) (citing SEC, Recom-
mendations Regarding the October 1987 Market Break 13 (Feb. 3, 1988)).
219. See City Bar Association Report, supra note 210. See generally Power, Futures
Exchanges Urged To Allow Block Trading, Wall St. J., Mar. 3, 1989, at C15, col. 4 (dis-
cussing City Bar Associaiton Report and block trading).
220. See City Bar Association Report, supra note 210, at 39-44.
221. See id. at 50.
222. Id. at 50-51.
223. See id. at 51-52.
224. See Letter from Jerrold E. Salzman to the author (Mar. 29, 1989) (on file at Ford-
ham Law Review).
225. See Crawford & Gaines, Merc Moves Would Go to Core of Trading, Chicago Trib-
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SO.226
There are other incongruities and uncertainties in the regulation of
floor trading practices. For example, another prohibition contained in
the Commodity Exchange Act concerns "accommodation" trading.227
Historically this type of trading involved transactions between two clear-
ing firms in which one house was net long while the other was net short.
As a result, both firms had to post margin funds with the clearing house
to secure their exposed net long or short positions. To avoid such pay-
ment, the firm that was net long sold sufficient futures contracts to the
firm that was net short to place each firm in an even or nearly even posi-
tion. This reduced or eliminated the need to put up margin with the
clearing house. Later, another transaction was entered to unwind the
first transaction. In the meantime, each house had the use of the margin
money.
228
After the passage of the Commodity Exchange Act in 1936, the CEA
sought to expand the definition of accommodation trading to include
"wash trading entered into by one broker to assist another broker to
make cross trades, wash trades, etc. ' 229 The CFTC has also sought to
expand accommodation trading to include instances where floor brokers
assist other floor brokers in noncompetitive transactions and in transac-
tions that allow brokers to trade indirectly against their customers.230
The cross trade is another type of transaction prohibited under the
une, Apr. 21, 1989, § 3, at 1, col. 2; McMurray, Chicago Merc Panel Unveils Tighter
Rules, Wall St. J., Apr. 20, 1989, Cl, at C12, col. 6. Members of the key exchanges have
criticized some of the committee's proposals. See McMurray, Chicago Merc Plans Trad-
ing Outside Pits, Wall St. J., Sept. 22, 1989, at Cl, col. 3; McMurray, Many Chicago Merc
Members Criticize a Proposed Package of Tougher Rules, Wall St. J., Apr. 28, 1989, at
C15, col. 1.
226. The proposal approved by the Board of Governors would allow orders of 300 or
more futures contracts to be executed through solicitation outside the pit or by having the
executing broker become the contra party. "The rule is comparable to the block facilita-
tion rules on major U.S. securities exchanges." Chicago Mercantile Exchange, Special
Executive Report S-2159 (Sept. 21, 1989); see Berg, Chicago Merc to Allow Some Trading
OffFloor, N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 1989, at Dl, col. 4.
227. See 7 U.S.C. § 6c (1982); see also 80 Cong. Rec. 8088 (1936) (for a definition of
accommodation trades).
228. See 5 Federal Trade Commission, Report on the Grain Trade 248 (1920); 80
Cong. Rec. 8089 (1936).
229. Letter from Alex C. Caldwell, Administrator of Commodity Exchange Authority,
to Deputy Administrator of Division and Region Directors (May 25, 1966) (defining
various trade practices prohibited by the Commodity Exchange Act) (on file at Fordham
Law Review).
230. See CFTC, Glossary of Some Terms Commonly Used in the Futures Trading
Industries I (Aug. 1978). In In re Sundheimer, [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut.
L. Rep. (CCH) 21,245 (C.F.T.C. Sept. 16, 1981), aff'd, Sundheimer v. CFTC, 688 F.2d
150 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1022 (1983), the CFTC stated that, where
prearranged transactions allowed an oil company to utilize a commodity futures market
for extrinsic advantage without exposure to market risk, the transactions were tanta-
mount to accommodation trades prohibited by Section 4c of the Commodity Exchange
Act. See id. at 25,219 & n.8; Commodity Exchange Act § 4c (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6c
(1982 & Supp. V 1987)). See generally In re Buckwalter, [1984-1986 Transfer Binder]
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Commodity Exchange Act. 31 Certain cross trades are permitted, as
where a broker has in hand an order to buy and an order to sell from
different customers. The orders can be matched against each other at the
market prices or at the limit prices upon open outcry pursuant to ex-
change rules.232 Some exchange rules permit this practice but require
approval of an exchange official, indicating that the trade was done by
open outcry. Other exchanges prohibit the practice entirely.
233
The CFTC prohibited a type of cross trading that involves the direct
or indirect offsetting of customer orders. These transactions allow a floor
broker to profit by offsetting transactions in his own or a competing floor
broker's account.234 The legislative history of the Commodity Exchange
Act notes that such cross trades are fictitious trades recorded as real
trades and used
by pit brokers [as devices] for becoming buyers in respect to selling
orders of customers and vice versa. They take the form of a recorded
double purchase and sale between two brokers. Each broker is re-
corded as having both bought from and sold to the other the same
quantity of the same futures at the same price.2 35
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) t 22,782, at 31,277 (C.F.T.C. Sept. 27, 1985) (accommoda-
tion trades involve cooperation by one trader with another in an unlawful manner).
The recent indictments in Chicago also charge accommodation trading: "It was fur-
ther a part of the scheme that the defendants would accommodate one another in illegal,
prearranged trades." United States v. Dempsey, No. 89-666, indictment at 18 (N.D. Ill.
Aug. 2, 1989).
231. See 7 U.S.C. § 6c (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
232. CFTC Regulation 1.39 permits such cross-trades conducted in accordance with
exchange rules. See 17 C.F.R. § 1.39(a) (1987).
233. Compare Coffee, Sugar & Cocoa Exchange, Floor Trading Rule No. 3.13 (certain
cross trades permitted if verified by Exchange employee) and Chicago Mercantile Ex-
change, Floor Privileges-Trading Qualifications and Practices Rule No. 533 (procedure
allowed with approval of Exchange official) with Chicago Board of Trade, Floor Practices
Rule No. 332.00 (trader forbidden from acting as agent for both buyer and seller, either
directly or indirectly).
234. See 7 U.S.C. § 6b(D) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). Offsetting is permitted with the
prior consent of the customer. See id. See generally CFTC Interpretive Letter No. 83-7,
[1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 21,907, at 27,929 (Oct. 25,
1983) (futures commission merchants may knowingly take other side of customer's order
only with proper authorization contained in document separate and distinct from cus-
tomer agreement); CFTC, Interpretive Statement and Specification of Terms and Condi-
tions for Certain Exemptions, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCII) S
20,441, at 21,797 (July 7, 1977) (floor broker must have prior consent of customer before
taking other side of customer order).
235. 80 Cong. Rec. 8089 (1936). The following example was given:
Broker A is put down as seller to broker B of 5,000 bushels of May wheat at $1
per bushel and is also put down as buyer from B of 5,000 bushels at $1 per
bushel. The transaction appears to be without purpose and without effect. But
A, having made an actual sale of 5,000 bushels of May wheat for a customer at,
say, $1.01 reports to his commission firm that the customer's order has been
executed at $1. Thereupon, he switches the sold side of his own $1 cross trade
for the actual $1.01 sale for the customer and takes a profit for himself of the 1-
cent difference, which should have been added to the sale price for the cus-
tomer. In this example, of course, it is assumed that there is a 1-cent fluctuation
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The attempt to prohibit cross trades thus seems to be directed at the
specific practice of indirectly trading against customer orders to the det-
riment of the customer and to the profit of the floor brokers.
II. REFORMS IN THE COMMODITY FUTURES MARKETS
A. Dual Trading And Time Stamps
The greatest area of concern in the commodity futures markets in-
volves dual trading. It is a practice that has been deeply ingrained in the
industry, and is often strongly defended. The CFTC has permitted dual
trading, principally on the grounds that it does not have sufficient data to
determine whether the practice is harmful. The adoption of time-stamp-
ing requirements for the execution of trades, however, would eliminate
that obstacle and allow the CFTC to make such a determination. But
whatever the outcome of a review of the effects of dual trading, the public
perception will persist that commodity futures trading provides advan-
tages to dual traders trading on the floor.236 This perception is due in
part to the time and place advantages enjoyed by the floor trader and the
inherent conflicts of dual trading. The public will likely suspect that a
floor broker will protect his own rather than his customers' trading inter-
est and that there is a strong temptation to cheat. For these reasons,
Congress is considering banning dual trading, at least in active trading
pits.
237
in price while the customer's order is in the hands of the pit broker and before
he reports execution.
Id.
236. See generally Petacque & Greising, 'Charades' Played in Pits, Chicago Sun Times,
Jan. 27, 1989, at 3, col. 1 (dual trading in Chicago criticized in press by Governor of
Illinois).
237. See Ricks, Senators Propose Tougher Rules in Futures Markets, Wall St. J., Mar.
10, 1989, at C13, col. 5; CFTC Asks Funds, Gets Talking-To, Chicago Tribune, Apr. 7,
1989, § 3, at 1, col. 2. One initial congressional proposal would curb dual trading in any
pit where an exchange audit trail could not demonstrate a one minute accuracy rate of
90% or better and where liquidity is adequate to fill customers' orders efficiently. See
Letter from Senator Patrick Leahy to John Damgard, President of the Futures Industry
Association (Mar. 16, 1989) (on file atFordham Law Review). A bill passed by the House
of Representatives would set a threshold level of trading whereby traders in pits with
average daily trading volume in excess of 7,000 contracts would be barred from dual
trading, absent unusual circumstances. See H.R. Rep. No. 236, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 2
(1989).
The CFTC has directed the exchanges to determine whether dual trading should be
curtailed or eliminated as a result of the FBI sting operation. See McMurray, Exchanges
Told to Look Into Dual Trading, Wall St. J., Mar. 9, 1989, at C13, col. 1; Letter from
Andrea M. Corcoran, Director of CFTC Division of Trading and Markets, to Thomas R.
Donovan, President of CBOT (Feb. 7, 1989) (discussing issues to explore in self-regula-
tory review, including whether to curtail or eliminate dual trading) (on file at Fordham
Law Review). The Chicago exchanges have also considered prohibiting or restricting dual
trading themselves, although the Chicago Board of Trade seems to have retreated from
such a position. See McMurray, Board of Trade Affirms Support of Dual Trading, Wall
St. J., May 2, 1989, at C14, col. 6; Crawford & Gaines, Merc Moves Would Go to Core of
Trading, Chicago Tribune, Apr. 21, 1989, § 3, at 1, col. 2; Berg, Merc Panel Issues Pro-
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A prohibition against dual trading would serve to curtail the appear-
ance of a conflict of interest. It would not, however, stop all abuses or
appear to do so. For example, a prohibition against dual trading would
not preclude bag trades and other fraudulent transactions, as where a
trader dealing for his own account is allowed to take advantage of a cus-
tomer order and then share profits either directly or indirectly with the
other trader. Such activities are fraudulent per se and prohibited under
any standard applied to the Commodity Exchange Act. Consequently, it
is doubtful whether new regulations, including a prohibition on dual
trading, would be any more effective in stopping such transactions. In-
stead, more sophisticated surveillance data is needed to uncover and de-
ter such violations.
Specifically, automated timing procedures for order execution and
computerized market surveillance to detect trades that occur away from
the market would be the most effective way to stop these types of fraud.
For example, if every transaction was required to have an automated
time sequence in order to obtain entry into the exchange's computer sys-
tem, the timing of the trade would be known and the time of the transac-
tion could be compared with other transactions on the exchange. Where
it appears that the trade was away from the market, then further investi-
gation would be warranted.238
The CFTC and the major exchanges, such as the Chicago Board of
posals to Combat Trading Abuses, N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 1989, at DI, col. 1; McMurray,
Chicago Merc to Seek Tougher Trading Rules, Wall St. J., Apr. 18, 1989, at Cl, col. 5;
Burns, Merc May Push Revamp of Dual Trading, Chicago Sun Times, Feb. 13, 1989, at
41, col. 1; Crawford & Gaines, CBOT Officials Stand Behind Dual Trading, Chicago Sun
Times, Feb. 10, 1989, at 1, col. 3; Norris, Marketplace: The Pits Hang on to Dual Trad-
ing, N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1989, at D8, col. 3; Neikirk & Jouzaitis, Dual Trade Tactic
Likely on Way Out, Chicago Tribune, Feb. 3, 1989, § 3, at 1, col. 2. The Chicago Mer-
cantile Exchange did adopt a regulation pursuant to which traders in its Standard &
Poor's 500 stock index futures pit must decide before every trading session whether they
are trading for their own account or for customers. The CFTC has also announced that
it plans to restrict dual trading in some form, although the exact nature of its restrictions
has not yet been published. See Salwen, CFTC Plans Curbs on Dual Trading in Commod-
ities, Wall St. J., Oct. 18, 1989, at Cl, col. 6.
Most exchanges based in New York have opposed prohibitions on dual trading. See
Four Exchanges in New York Support Brokers' Dual Trading, Wall St. J., May 4, 1989, at
C13, col. 3. For a discussion of the merits of dual trading, see T. Hieronymus, Econom-
ics of Futures Trading 342-343 (2d ed. 1977).
238. According to a CFTC internal review, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange seems to
provide much of the needed data. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text. The
exchange surveillance system has resulted in an increased number of disciplinary actions.
See Burns, Merc Punishes Eight Members, Chicago Sun Times, Apr. 5, 1989, at 57, col. 5;
Mere Fines or Warns 8 Traders in Broker Association Cases, Chicago Tribune, Apr. 5,
1989, § 3, at 3, col. 1; Chicago Merc Disciplines 8, N.Y. Times, Apr. 5, 1989, at D19, col.
3. The Chicago Board of Trade's CTR system, although found by the CFTC staff to be
insufficient, see supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text, has also brought an increased
number of disciplinary actions. See Berg, Commodity Exchanges See Threat, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 13, 1989, at D1, col. 6 ("Disciplinary actions have more than tripled at both
[brokerage] exchanges since 1984-to 207 at the Merc and to 879 at the Board of
Trade.").
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Trade, are seeking to create more certainty in execution times by requir-
ing broker tickets to be picked up more frequently and by reducing
bracket periods. These and other steps are designed to minimize the op-
portunities for floor traders to victimize customers by entering fraudulent
and fictitious trades during periods of price fluctuations. That effort may
be successful, but it will require constant monitoring to eliminate all op-
portunity for fraud. It may also be superseded by events, as Congress
may require the timing of executions within one minute, and later within
30 seconds.239
Without doubt, the most effective method for ensuring an accurate au-
dit trail is to record automatically the entry time and eliminate the op-
portunity to change paperwork that is submitted to the exchange. This
would, however, require a sophisticated computerized order entry mech-
anism in the trading pit itself. It is unclear whether current technology
could produce such a sophisticated system. 2 ° Such a system would
guarantee that transactions are properly timed and would eliminate most
post-fact order changes, but would still be imperfect. The floor broker
holding a deck of customer orders would have the additional burden of
handling a computer, which would be awkward in the pit. 4 Although
239. See H.R. Rep. No. 236, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1989). The House bill was
passed by a vote of 420-0. See Salwen, Commodities Oversight Bill Clears House, Wall St.
J., Sept. 14, 1989, at C14, col. 6. The bill does not appear to require time-stamping of
executions. Rather, it appears to still allow a CTR system such as that used by the
Chicago Board of Trade. See H.R. Rep. No. 236, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1989). Prior
to the passage of the House bill, the CFTC has proposed requiring collection of broker's
trading cards every thirty minutes in order to increase the integrity of the audit trail. See
54 Fed. Reg. 37117 (1989). But the General Accounting Office concluded that these and
other CFTC proposals for preventing the conduct discovered in Chicago were inade-
quate. See Salwen, CFTC Plan to Curb Trading Abuses is Weak, GAO Says, Wall St. J.,
Sept. 8, 1989, at C13, col. 1.
240. In 1984 the CFTC was of the view that technology was sufficient to permit time-
stamping. See Trade Time-Sequencing Standards and Exchange Audit Trail Systems,
[1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) % 22,450, at 29,973-74 (Dec. 27,
1984). The CFTC was later convinced that the technology was not available for precise
trade timing standards. Eventually, the CFTC conceded that technological advances
would allow improved trade timing, although time-stamping machines were still clearly
"inappropriate" for higher transactions pits. See CFTC Division of Trading and Mar-
kets, Memoranda: Audit Trail Enhancements: Proposed Amendments to Commission
Regulation 1.35, at 105-06 (Jan. 14, 1986).
The Chicago Board of Trade and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange have announced
plans to develop a hand held electronic terminal that will time trades as they are executed
in the pit. See Moneyline: Futures Plan, USA Today, Aug. 17, 1989, at B1, col. 1. The
Commodity Exchange, Inc. has announced that it too is developing a computerized order
entry device for its floor traders. The hand held computer would provide tamper-proof
time-stamping of trades. See New Computerized Order-Entry Device Unveiled by Comex,
Wall St. J., Sept. 28, 1989, at C16, col. 6.
241. The deck is a stack of orders that are to be executed away from the current
price. Some are to buy and some are to sell as the price rises while others are to
buy and sell as the price declines. Some are at specific prices while others are
for immediate execution as soon as a price is reached, and some involve a scale
of quantities and prices. The orders are typically on pieces of paper about five
by seven inches. The broker arranges them in the order of execution that will
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the computer could be used to call up orders, this would require a display
panel so that the broker would know at a glance what orders he was
holding in his deck. But that display would increase the size of the com-
puter and would also expose those orders to other traders in the pit.
These and other practical problems abound.
It should also be noted that there is substantial resistance on the part
of the exchanges to a completely automatic order process. First, the ex-
changes are concerned that technology would slow trading and thereby
impair the functioning of the pits. An attorney for the Chicago Board of
Trade asserted that time-stamping could, in fact, cause trading to be
shifted from the United States to exchanges abroad that do not have the
CFTC's audit trial concerns.24 2 This argument should be taken seri-
ously. The exchange pits are, indeed, efficient mechanisms for executing
trades. This was demonstrated as recently as the market crash of 1987
when the efficiency of the futures pits matched or exceeded that of the
New York Stock Exchange. 243 This efficiency should not be threatened
unless absolutely necessary.
Nevertheless, advocates of an audit trail process have contended that a
"black box" system is needed for the exchanges. 2" A black box involves
computerized trading conducted through computer terminals rather than
in a pit on the floor of an exchange. Under such a system, floor traders
would not be clustered on the floor but would operate through computer
terminals. It is thought that this impersonalization of the market would
prevent rigged trading because the traders would have neither advance
knowledge nor time and place advantages over other traders. Instead,
customer orders would be entered into the system and all traders would
have an equal opportunity to trade against them.24 5
take place as the price moves up or down. He then folds them lengthwise for
concealment and puts them in his pocket so that his hands will be free to handle
his trading card and pencil, and to signal with. Occasionally, the decks are as
much as an inch thick and require great memory skill and anticipatory
planning.
T. Hieronymus, Economics of Futures Trading 53 (2d ed. 1977). The New York Stock
Exchange already has miniature computerized "electronic display books" for holding
customer limit orders. See Melloan, Is the Big Board All Dressed Up with Nowhere to Go,
Wall St. J., Oct. 3, 1989, at A23, col. 3.
242. Letter from John H. Stassen to the author (Mar. 8, 1989) (on file at Fordham Law
Review).
243. See Markham & Stephanz, The Stock Market Crash of 1987-The United States
Looks at New Recommendations, 76 Geo. L.J. 1993, 2027-28 (1988).
244. See generally Jouzaitis & Widder, Probe Forces Reform Issue on Exchanges, Chi-
cago Tribune, Jan. 22, 1989, § 7, at 1, col. 5 (discussing effect of FBI probe on open
outcry procedure).
245. See generally The World's Traders Get Off the Floor, Euromoney, May 1985, at
154 (discussing computerized trading systems in London, Sydney, Tokyo, Toronto and
Zurich); Morris, Trading Automation: Easier Said Than Done, American Banker, July 9,
1982, at 3 (discussing benefits and disadvantages of computerized trading); 100-Million-
Share Days?, Forbes, Nov. 12, 1979, at 18 (discussing results of Merrill Lynch's use of
electronic stock trading on a day of heavy trading); Watchpoodle?, The Economist, Apr.
7, 1979, at 114 (SEC urges exchanges to implement "black-box" trading); Which Way to
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Opponents of black box trading contend that it will reduce liquidity by
limiting an atmosphere on the floor that encourages floor traders to trade
for their own accounts and thereby add liquidity to the market. That is,
floor traders become caught up in the excitement, rumors and frenzy on
the floor and trade more than they would sitting in the more cold and
calculating environment of their office. Moreover, floor traders may not
be willing to risk as much of their capital absent the frenzy or informa-
tion available on the trading floor.246
Notwithstanding such claims, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange is de-
veloping a system called Globex, which allows after-hours trading of
commodity futures contracts. Globex is a computerized system that al-
lows trades to be executed and entered after trading ceases on the floor of
the exchange in Chicago.247 The Chicago Board of Trade has also devel-
oped a system called Aurora.248 Like Globex, Aurora allows trading of
contracts when Chicago markets are closed. The Board of Trade's Au-
rora system, however, uses computer graphics to simulate a futures pit,
a National Securities Market?, The Economist, Apr. 29, 1978, at 105 (discussing SEC
proposals for a national market system); Hershman, Here Comes the New Stock Market,
Dun's Review, Apr. 1978, at 65 (electronic markets would aid investor at expense of
specialist); New York Stock Exchange; Black Box Blackballed, The Economist, July 10,
1976, at 105 (specialists have most to lose if exchanges adopt the "black-box").
246. See Melamed, The Mechanics of a Commodity Futures Exchange: A Critique of
Automation of the Transaction Process, 6 Hofstra L. Rev. 149 (1977); Whitehouse, LIFFE
Could Adopt Automated Trading by Next Year, Reuters Release, Apr. 14, 1988. The
Administrator of the Commodity Exchange Authority noted during the hearings on the
CFTC Act of 1974 that he favored computerizing floor trading on the contract markets.
See H.R. Rep. 975, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (1974). The CFTC Act of 1974 included a
provision permitting the CFTC to consider computerized trading. Section 18 of the
Commodity Exchange Act states that:
The Commission shall establish and maintain, as part of its ongoing operations,
research and information programs to (1) determine the feasibility of trading by
computer, and the expanded use of modem information system technology,
electronic data processing, and modem communication systems by commodity
exchanges, boards of trade, and by the Commission itself for purposes of im-
proving, strengthening, facilitating, or regulating futures trading operations; (2)
assist in the development of educational and other informational materials re-
garding futures trading for dissemination and use among producers, market
users, and the general public; and (3) carry out the general purposes of this
chapter.
(b) The Commission shall include in its annual reports to Congress plans
and findings with respect to implementing this section.
7 U.S.C. § 22 (1982). In 1977, the CFTC conducted an industry conference on automa-
tion at which various economists, finance professors and technological experts debated
the issues associated with automation in the futures industry. See Melamed, supra, at
151. The CFTC has also reported on the program of computerized trading in its annual
reports. See, e.g., 1988 CFTC Ann. Rep. 116 (discussing technological innovations im-
plemented at the various exchanges).
247. See Chicago Mercantile Exchange, Globex (1989); Berg, 2 Big Futures Exchanges
in a Race, N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 1989, at D2, col. 1.
248. See Chicago Board of Trade, Aurora/Eos: The Dawn of a New Age in Intema-
tional Trading (1989); Campbell, CBOT Takes Wraps Off Aurora and Eos Systems, Fin.
Times, Mar. 17, 1989; Shellenbarger, CBOT, in a Sign of the Times, May Finally Join
Electronic Age, Wall St. J., Feb. 6, 1989, § 3, at 1, col. 3.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58
while Globex simply matches buy and sell orders. With the Aurora sys-
tem the floor trader is identified on the computer screen and a bid or offer
may be made to a particular trader.249
Whatever their relative merits to traders, these two systems may indi-
cate how effective computerized trading would be in preventing abuses
and whether the atmosphere of the floor is a significant factor in trading
volume.25° Unfortunately, there is still some doubt whether a computer-
ized system will provide a definitive answer to the question of the effec-
tiveness of computerized trading because after-hours trading in other
environments, such as links with foreign exchanges, has not proved to be
as successful as trading conducted during the regular hours of the
exchanges.2
In any event, it would not seem necessary for trading on the floor of
the exchanges to be eliminated entirely in favor of a computer environ-
ment. To date, the exchanges have been efficient in developing new prod-
ucts and providing liquidity to many financial instruments which, though
previously not traded, have become a necessary part of large portfolio
management.252 It would not seem appropriate to rule out exchange
trading simply because abuses have been occurring on the floors. Rather,
the CFTC should concentrate on eliminating those abuses through more
249. See Berg, 2 Big Futures Exchanges in a Race, N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 1989, at D2,
col. 1; Campbell, Technology Wars Ravage Chicago, Fin. Times, Mar. 21, 1989.
250. The Chicago Board of Trade has charged that the Globex system is susceptible to
manipulation, prearranged trading and other abuses. See Board of Trade Opposes Merc'
Electronic Trading System, Associated Press Release, Sept. 12, 1988; The CBOT Has
Capitulated. Has Automated Trading Come of Age?, Fin. Times, Mar. 8, 1989; Bums,
Probe May Complicate Merc's Computer Move, Chicago Sun Times, Jan. 26, 1989, at 63,
col. 1. Nevertheless, automation is making inroads into exchange trading systems and
the Chicago Board of Trade and Chicago Mercantile Exchange have apparently decided
to bury the hatchet over the relative merits of their proposed trading systems. Instead,
they have agreed to act jointly in developing such a system. See McMurray, Exchanges
Link Trades After-Hours, Wall St. J., May 30, 1989, at C1, col. 6; Gaines, Traders
Trained by Computer, Chicago Tribune, Apr. 5, 1989, § 3, at 7, col. 6; Towie, PC Option
Makes Impact at Futures Exchange, The Australian, Mar. 28, 1989; see also Seifert, Se-
lected Computerized Trading Issues, Address Before the Futures Industry Association
Division of Law and Compliance (May 11, 1989) (discussing and proposing resolutions to
computerized trading issues).
251. See Wolman, Singapore 5; From a Slow Start to Soaring Trading Volumes, Finan-
cial Times, Nov. 13, 1987, at V; Skinner, Commodities Traders Try to Find the Best Way
to Trade 24 Hours, Reuters Business Report, Aug. 6, 1987; Exchanges Continue to Forge
Trading Links Despite Slow Volume to Date, Securities Week, July 6, 1987, at 1. The FBI
investigation has not hampered efforts to develop the Globex trading system. See Elec-
tronic Trading Plan Wins Easily, Chicago Tribune, Feb. 3, 1989, at 1, col. 6.
252. These new products traditionally have been important to the agricultural indus-
tries. The number of futures contracts traded per year has increased dramatically in
recent years. In 1976, some 37 million futures contracts were traded. See Futures Indus-
try Association, Volume of Futures Trading 1960-1986 (1986). By 1986 the number of
futures contracts traded in the United States exceeded 183,000,000. See 1986 CFTC
Ann. Rep. 3. In 1988, the volume expanded to 290.7 million futures and options con-
tracts. See 1988 CFTC Ann. Rep. 13. Indeed, in 1988 the Chicago Board of Trade alone
traded some 143 million contracts. See Hargreaves, Tighter Regulation Feared, Financial
Times, Apr. 10, 1989. See generally B. Carroll, Financial Futures Trading 41-44 (1989).
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effective enforcement.253
There also seem to be alternatives and compromises that can be made.
Most commodity futures trading could be subjected to an audit trail pro-
cess and dual trading limitations which would address many of the con-
cerns which provoked the FBI investigation. In pits with low trading
volume it would seem that, just as in the case of the CBOE (which actu-
ally has several high volume pits), time-stamping could be permitted and
should be required. In pits where there is massive trading volume that
could be affected by delays in time-stamping, there needs to be increased
automation.25 4 But not all months of the pit trade as actively. Time-
stamping could be required in back months immediately. In more active
months where the busier brokers trade, the exchange could assign addi-
tional officials to report execution size, price and to quickly gather and
remove paperwork from the pit.255 Further, these traders could be pro-
hibited from engaging in dual trading; they can hardly claim that dual
trading is necessary for liquidity while claiming that liquidity is so great
that they do not have the time to time-stamp orders. Once these reforms
are in place, more careful scrutiny can be given to the establishment of
more certain audit trails for these active pits.256
B. Trade Practice Prohibitions
Regulation is impaired by the uncertainty of what constitutes a prohib-
ited fictitious sale, wash trade, accommodation transaction, and cross
trade as well as by uncertainty as to what is meant by a prearranged
fictitious transaction.25 7 More precise definitions are needed of terms
which concern questionable, and potentially prohibited, trading prac-
253. While it is not known whether computerized trading would be effective in the
prevention of trading abuses, many believe that a computer environment could, in fact,
reduce market efficiency. See supra note 246 and accompanying text. Efforts to automate
exchanges in some areas have not been completely successful. For example, the Cincin-
nati Stock Exchange is automated, but has not had large trading volumes. A recent effort
to automate exchange trading in London resulted in large losses. An effort to create an
automated futures exchange in Bermuda also failed. See Miller & Winkler, Computerized
Trading Starts to Make Inroads at Financial Exchanges, Wall St. J., Apr. 24, 1989, at 1,
col. 6. The Hong Kong Stock Exchange might be the model for future computerized
exchanges. See Smithsonian, Apr. 1989, at 50. Unfortunately, however, the Hong Kong
Exchange has not met with success. See, e.g., Prest, Hong Kong Set For Financial Revi-
val, Canberra Times, Mar. 27, 1989 (discussing the after-effects of the 1987 market crash
and closure of the Hong Kong Futures Exchange).
254. Trading volumes vary widely in the various commodity futures pits, ranging from
0 to 70 million contracts. See 1988 CFTC Ann. Rep. 96-101.
255. See Sing, Reforms to Alter Way U.S. Trades in Futures, L.A. Times, Jan. 29, 1989,
Pt. 4, at 1, col. 5. "Dual trading... already is forbidden among brokers who occupy the
top step of the CME's huge Standard & Poor's 500 stock index futures pit." Merc Eyes
Limits on Dual Trading, United Press International Release, Feb. 13, 1989.
256. In fact, the trading pits targeted by the FBI stings were some of the most liquid
pits in the commodity futures industry. See O'Connor & Marx, Trading Pits Not for the
Faint of Heart. . . or Body, Chicago Tribune, Feb. 5, 1989, § 1, at 20, col. 1; Gunset &
Winter, Customer Outcry Hard to Hear, Chicago Tribune, Jan. 25, 1989, § 1, at 1, col. 4.
257. See supra notes 148-202 and accompanying text.
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tices. Although Congress could provide such clarification by amending
the Commodity Exchange Act, history has shown that markets change
and such new definitions will become outdated quickly. Congress simply
cannot keep up with the commodity futures industry, which changes
constantly and rapidly. As a result, it would seem to be more practical
for the CFTC to be given authority to adopt regulations defining specific
prohibited practices.258 The Commission has already done this through
Regulation 155.2259 which requires the exchanges to adopt prohibitions
against various practices. This requirement, however, should be supple-
mented by CFTC regulations that would detail the conditions under
which a broker can execute orders. Such regulations should include
practices which are permitted as well as those that are prohibited so that
traders can function in a safe harbor without concern as to liability. This
authority could also be used to define manipulative practices and other
trading concerns that have plagued the CFTC for years.260
To illustrate, if the CFTC were given authority by Congress to pro-
mulgate specific prohibitions, it could prohibit certain transactions and
define the banned transactions as follows:261
The following trade practices constitute fraudulent and manipulative
conduct in violation of the Commodity Exchange Act when done
knowingly and willfully:
(a) Wash Sales. Wash sales are buy and sell transactions for the
same commodity in the same delivery month that are entered
by the same traders, or traders acting in concert, with the in-
tent that the orders will offset each other. Wash sales do not
include simultaneous buy and sell transactions entered into
for the purpose of changing a trader's position in the ex-
change's line for delivery notices and do not include scalping
transactions that result in a "scratch" trade that does not have
a gain or loss, provided the transaction was entered into for
the purpose of making a profit or for other bona fide commer-
cial reasons.
(b) Accommodation Trades. Accommodation trades are any
transactions in which a floor broker allows any other trader to
profit from a customer order held by the floor broker through
any arrangement other than by an open and competitive out-
cry on the floor of the exchange or other transaction permit-
258. The opportunity for Congressional action is already present. The CFTC is con-
ducting hearings to determine whether it should be reauthorized and whether additional
legislation is needed. See Wayne, With Futures Under Fire, a Watchdog Feels the Heat,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1989, § 3, at 1, col. 3. The House of Representatives has already
passed a bill that would prohibit certain forms of "insider" trading. See H.R. Rep. No.
236, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1989).
259. See 17 C.F.R. § 155.2 (1988).
260. See Markham, "'Front-Running"---Insider Trading Under the Commodity Ex-
change Act, 38 Cath. U.L. Rev. 69, 123-24 (1988).
261. The following terms have been defined by the author unless otherwise noted. The
definitions reflect current market practices and trading abuse procedures.
[Vol. 58
COMMODITIES REGULATION
ted by exchange rules. Accommodation trades include but
are not limited to:
(1) the undoing or "busting" of a customer's already exe-
cuted order in order to allow another trader to execute an
order at the price of the customer's order or at some other
price.
(2) entering into an order with another trader at a pre-deter-
mined price in order to allow that trader or any other
trader to profit from a customer order.
(3) splitting or adjusting prices during opening or closing ro-
tations except that adjustments for bona fide reporting er-
rors may be corrected in accordance with exchange out-
trade procedures.
(4) entering into or executing any futures transactions after
the close of trading.
(5) executing a customer limit order through noncompetitive
arrangements with any other broker or brokers.
(6) engaging three-cornered or similar deals where three or
some other number of traders engage in noncompetitive
trades in order to take advantage of customer orders.
(7) entering into "ginzy" trades or other noncompetitive
trading for purposes of split tick trading or for other
purposes.
(8) "cuffing" trades by delaying the filling of customer orders
to benefit another trader.2 62
(9) engaging in any activity during trade checking or out-
trade procedures in order to wrongfully deprive a cus-
tomer of profits.26 3
(c) Cross Trades. Cross trades are prohibited unless conducted in
conformance with Regulation 1.39 of the Commodity Ex-
change Act. Cross trades are any transaction in which a floor
broker crosses for execution in the pit a buy and sell order of
two different customers. Such orders are to be independently
262. A variety of trade practice abuses, which can occur in the open outcry commodi-
ties markets, were identified and discussed before the Senate Committee on Agriculture,
Nutrition and Forestry. See Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the Chicago
Futures Exchanges' Detection of Trade Practice Abuses Before the Committee on Agri-
culture, Nutrition and Forestry of the United States Senate, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5
(1989) (statement of Richard L. Fogel, Assistant Comptroller General, General Govern-
ment Programs).
263. The commodity markets require all trades to be matched at the clearinghouse
with the opposing broker. Because of the confusion that occurs during active trading,
errors frequently occur as to the size of the order, the price or the identity of the execut-
ing broker. When the trades do not match they are called "out-trades" and the parties
have to settle their differences before trading begins the next day. See P. Johnson and T.
Hazen, I Commodities Regulation § 1.31, at 115 (2d ed. 1989). It was charged in the
Chicago indictments that out-trades were used as a mechanism for misappropriating cus-
tomer funds and orders. See United States v. Bailin, No. 89-668, indictment at 11, 22
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 2, 1989). The CFTC has also acted to tighten out-trade procedures. See
54 Fed. Reg. 37004 (1989). The Chicago Board of Trade has also acted to tighten its out-
trade procedures in the wake of the Chicago indictments. See CBT Board Approves New
Outtrade Rules and Delays Fee Hike Vote, Securities Week, Sept. 25, 1989, at 1.
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and separately handled by different brokers unless otherwise
permitted by exchange rules.
(d) Fictitious Sales. A fictitious sale is any transaction that is not
executed openly and competitively on the floor of the ex-
change as required by Regulation 1.38.
(e) Prearranged Trades. Prearranged trades are any trades that
are arranged prior to their execution in a manner that ex-
cludes or impairs the open and competitive execution required
by Regulation 1.38. A prearranged trade does not include ne-
gotiations and indications of interest for block trades prior to
their execution on the floor of the exchange provided that the
following conditions are met:
(1) the size of order eligible for such procedures is such that:
(a) in view of the liquidity of the particular market, there
is a reasonable probability that the order could not be ef-
fective without itself causing a substantial effect on price;
and (b) the order is of a size typically used by commercial
participants;
(2) the transactions must be bid or offered on the contract
market, by open outcry or other competitive method, with
adequate opportunity for public participation; and
(3) any person of the transaction that has not promptly taken
up at the ring may be crossed, with the floor broker and/
or the futures commission merchant taking the opposite
side (with the consent of the customer), but only at the
price bid or offered on the contract market.
(f) Frontrunning. Frontrunning is the practice of trading in
commodity futures or options contracts with advance knowl-
edge of material non-public information about the cash, op-
tions, or futures market activities of any dealer, processor,
user or consumer of a commodity or customer of the acting
party where such activities could reasonably be foreseen to
affect market prices and where the information is obtained by
the acting party through employment with such persons or
through any confidential, fiduciary or any other such special
relationship with such persons.2
264. See Markham, "'Front-Running"---Insider Trading Under the Commodity Ex-
change Act, 38 Cath. U.L. Rev. 69, 124 (1988). The House has already approved legisla-
tion on frontrunning "insider" trading. See H.R. Rep. No. 236, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 11
(1989). The bill, however, does not contain an explicit prohibition against trading ahead
of customer orders, because the Department of Justice informed Congress that such con-
duct is adequately addressed under existing law. See id. at 46; Doyle, House Panel Ap-
proves CFTC Reauthorization, Associated Press Release, Aug. 3, 1989; see also H.R. Rep.
603, 101st. Cong., 1st Sess. I (Jan. 20, 1989) (bill introduced by Congressman Smith of
Iowa). See generally Bums & Greising, Will Probe Outcry Peril Open Outcry, Chicago
Sun Times, Jan. 22, 1989, at 60, col. 1 (discussing possible legislation to limit open outcry
system). Congress has also addressed the concern that associations of brokers were using
their relationships to defraud customers in the execution of their orders. A bill passed by
the House would restrict brokers in an association from trading with each other in exe-
cuting customer orders where a member of the association would be trading for his own
account. See H.R. Rep. No. 236, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1989).
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(1) Nonpublic information is information that has not been
disseminated in a manner which makes it generally avail-
able to the trading public through recognized channels of
distribution.2 65
(2) Material information is information which, if publicly
known, would be considered important by a reasonable
person in deciding whether to trade a particular commod-
ity interest on a contract market. As used in this section,
material information includes, but is not limited to, infor-
mation relating to present or anticipated cash, futures or
option positions or trading strategies.266
These definitions are by no means exhaustive or exclusive. Rather,
they could be supplemented or restricted as markets develop or particu-
lar abuses are discovered. What the definitions do provide is a safe har-
bor for market participants, while more clearly defining what conduct is
prohibited.
CONCLUSION
The commodity futures exchanges have become a key part of the fi-
nancial services system of the United States. There is, however, serious
concern, whether based on perception or fact, that the order execution
system on the floors of the exchanges is chaotic, unfair and possibly in-
vites serious fraud. That perception must be corrected in order to protect
the markets' integrity and the public's confidence. The most effective
way to guard the markets' integrity would be to ban dual trading in the
active trading pits and require automated data and timing information
upon which serious and substantial surveillance could be maintained. In
addition, the CFTC needs greater flexibility to attack abusive floor prac-
tices. First, off-exchange negotiations should be expanded to allow price
competition with the floor. This would assure that prices and traders on
the floor are kept honest by competing price discovery.2
67
Another necessary reform is to allow the CFTC broad authority to
prohibit manipulative and fraudulent practices. The CFTC regulations
should include floor rules which prohibit specific trading practices. The
rules should be simple and few, but should be detailed enough to give the
traders guidance. Such rules would include standards under which block
orders may be exposed to others.
Another needed reform is to professionalize the CFTC. Most of its
members are not lawyers and, with a few notable exceptions, virtually all
265. Markham, "Front-Running'-Insider Trading Under the Commodity Exchange
Act, 38 Cath. U.L. Rev. 69, 124 (1988).
266. Id.
267. See generally J. Markham, supra note 9, at 150-153 (discussing the CFTC's efforts
to curb trading abuses); Markham & Gilberg, Stock and Commodity Options-Two Reg-
ulatory Approaches and Their Conflicts, 47 Alb. L. Rev. 741 (1983) (discussing SEC and
CFTC regulatory efforts aimed at trading abuses).
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of its members have had little or no background in futures trading.26
The result has been uncertainty and delay in adopting needed regula-
tions. The CFTC has also been ill-equipped to counter the political
strength of the commodity exchanges whose contributions to and lobby-
ing efforts before Congress and the CFTC have delayed regulations and
efforts to automate the audit trail process.269 Congress should require
that the CFTC members be knowledgeable in commodity regulation, and
that a majority of exchange board members be representatives of the pub-
lic so as to ensure that exchange lobbying efforts are carried forward in
the public interest.27 °
268. See J. Markham, supra note 9, at 117-123.
269. See Vise, Why Won't Wild Swings in Markets Just Go Away?, Wash. Post, Oct. 18,
1989, at Fl, col. 2; Drew & Cohen, Tradeoff in Futures Industry: Customer Safeguards
Sacrificed to Growth, Critics Say, Chicago Tribune, Aug. 6, 1989, at 1, col. 3.
270. A bill recently approved by the House would require 20% representation of
outside members on exchange boards. See H.R. Rep. No. 236, 101st Cong., 1st Sess 6
(1989). See generally J. Markham, supra note 9, at 140-41 (discussing concern that gen-
eral public representation on CFTC is inadequate); Russo & Glickman, Business Forum:
Look Beyond the "Pits"for Directors, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1984, § 3, at 3, col. I (same).
A recent amendment has also been proposed that would require future CFTC commis-
sioners to have demonstrated knowledge in futures trading or its regulations. See Salwen,
Commodities Oversight Bill Clears House, Wall St. J., Sept. 14, 1989, at C14, col. 6.
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